Fore-armed
Date: 2025-12-22T00:00:00+00:00
Keywords: United States -- Defenses; Armies

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Title: Fore-armed

How to build a citizen army

Author: Granville Fortescue

Release date: December 22, 2025 [eBook #77534]

Language: English

Original publication: Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1916

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/77534

Credits: deaurider, chenzw and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FORE-ARMED ***

FORE-ARMED

FORE-ARMED
How to Build a Citizen Army

By
GRANVILLE FORTESCUE

Author of

“At the Front with Three Armies.” “What of the Dardanelles?”
“Russia, the Balkans, and the Dardanelles,” etc.

PHILADELPHIA
THE JOHN C. WINSTON COMPANY
PUBLISHERS

Copyright, 1916, by
The John C. Winston Co.

TO
G. F.

CONTENTS

| PAGE
Foreword | 9
The Swiss Military System | 13
The German Military System | 37
The French Military System | 59
The Australian Military System | 73
The English Military System | 90
The New Era in Warfare | 105

The Strategic Position of the United States

122

The Instinct of Defense | 146
What Shall We Do? | 163

FOREWORD

Since many citizens of the United States have become convinced of the necessity of preparedness against war, this book is presented in order to make available information as to the methods in use in other countries, where preparedness has long been accepted in principle and practice. From the experience of other nations, we may receive the light wherewith to resolve our own problem.

Out of a study of the defense-service of other peoples, American citizens can decide which plan, if any, best suits our race and our traditions. No system of citizen soldiery was evolved in a day. Undoubtedly legislators and staff officers will have to experiment largely with different schemes before our people are satisfied with results. If we begin on the right principle, however, it is safe to assume that American business sense will gradually build up a defensive organization commensurate with the needs of our menaced position.

But we must begin and we must work on the right principle.

As an indication of the unpreparedness of the United States, the maneuver problem suggested in Chapter VII was, in a measure, worked out on the Mexican border. With the greatest difficulty, and with the forces stationed in close vicinity of the expected conflict, an ill-proportioned American brigade was mobilized for active service within eight days. What would be the outcome, were we menaced by a first-class power, can easily be deduced.

I have availed myself of the publications of the War Department for many of the facts herein contained. Where my personal opinion is advanced, it is based upon ten years’ service in the United States Army, together with observations made during the Spanish-American war; Philippine insurrection; as military attaché with the Japanese army in front of Port Arthur; as correspondent in Morocco during the Riff war; and finally from experiences with the different armies in the European war of 1914.

Recent legislation affecting the military organization of the United States, is more a compromise with partisan politics than an honest effort in the line of preparedness. The Army Bill of 1916 was accepted by Army officers, Senators, and Congressmen who understand its faults, because it contains certain commendable features (such as helping the enlisted men more easily to obtain commissions, as suggested in this book on page 174, and the enlargement of West Point), and, under the antagonisms of parties, the advocates of preparedness were obliged to accept a large proportion of faulty provisions, or see all military legislation fail. It follows that such procedure is fundamentally wrong. But in the end, the plain people of the United States will determine the military course of the country. A knowledge of the plans in practice in other lands may help towards a correct decision of our country’s most urgent problem.

Washington, D. C.

CHAPTER I
The Swiss Military System

The average American, tackling the subject of preparedness for the first time, will wade through reams of rhetoric until his mind is a mass of undigested military facts and fancies. Glib and generous are the admonitions to prepare; yet the sum and substance of much that is being spoken and written on the subject, when skimmed of patriotic phrases, leaves but a residue of glittering generalities.

After listening to all the speeches pronounced at national defense conventions, and after reading all the data appearing in print, the average American still realizes how little he knows of what is comprised in the term “citizen soldiery.”

If any economic revolution is to follow the drafting of the majority of our younger citizens into a national militia, the voter wants to know it before he supports the Continental, Federal or any other kind of army.

The economic side of the question is particularly puzzling. Our kings of commerce, who resolve their problems into terms of business, would rarely send their sons into the army to work up from the bottom. As a business proposition the army is negligible. Commercial and professional life offer more substantial rewards. On the other hand, if the available youth of the country were subjected to a short period of military service, would this handicap our national development? How has it worked out in other nations?

The three most thoroughly tested citizen services are the Swiss, the German and the French. The Australian system, although not tested long in time, has proved its value in a manner worthy of close study. But let us begin with the Swiss. All military authorities agree on the proposition that the descendants of William Tell have evolved a nearly perfect national militia system; but these authorities insist that the Swiss plan is essentially militia and not regular. This distinction need not bother us, for no one wants to turn the great mass of male Americans into professional soldiers. My dictionary defines militia as citizen soldiery, and it is on that basis I shall lay before you the workings of the Swiss system.

Briefly, military service is compulsory and universal, with almost no exemptions save for actual physical disability. Citizens excused from service, as well as those called but rejected for mental or physical deficiencies, in lieu of service pay three special taxes. As nearly fifty per cent of all men annually called to the colors are rejected, those taxes amount to quite a tidy revenue.

The military taxes must be paid by every Swiss citizen, at home or abroad, who is not enrolled in the active or reserve armies. So, in addition to the men rejected, all citizens excused from military service for whatever cause are liable for these assessments, which are of three kinds: first, a military poll tax of six francs (approximately $1.20); second, the military property tax, which is 0.15 per cent of assessed value of property exceeding in amount $200; and third, a military income tax of 1.5 per cent on income. Military taxes are paid only during military age limits; that is, from the ages of twenty to forty-four. As a concession to the depreciation of a man’s usefulness as a soldier with increasing age, the taxes are half the stated sums between the ages of thirty-two and forty-four.

Of course, these taxes are assessed in addition to all other payments to the State and they are rigorously exacted, but no one person can be assessed a total military tax to exceed $600.

With a people so devoted to physical exercise, the number of rejections must seem high. We reconcile the paradox when we understand that the physical tests of the Swiss army are more severe than in Germany or France. The Swiss system is extremely selective. For example, the endurance tests, adequately severe, take the character of long tramps across country, something after the fashion of the test former President Roosevelt inaugurated for swivel-chair army officers, and the men who show physical deterioration under this ordeal are passed over for the more fit. Of course, the organization of the Swiss army is based upon the expected average annual recruitment, and it would seriously inconvenience the training staff and tax the depots and supply departments if an unusual number of recruits were accepted. So whenever the “class” is exceptional, the standard is, in a sense, raised by more rigorous selection. In time of emergency, all available men conforming to regulation requirements would be accepted.

Theoretically, liability to serve begins when the citizen is seventeen years of age and ends at the close of his forty-eighth year. In practice, actual service begins at the age of twenty. For the first twelve years service is with the first-line troops, called the Auszug or Elite; the following eight years the Swiss passes in the first reserve, or Landwehr; and the last eight years of service is with the second reserve, or Landsturm. This division does no military service except in war time.

Under this system Switzerland, which boasts approximately 4,000,000 population, has developed a defensive army of 150,000 soldiers with the colors, 120,000 in the first reserve, and 250,000 in the second reserve—a total of over 500,000 trained fighting men. Pausing to consider that Switzerland is but one-third the size of the State of Pennsylvania, with about half as many inhabitants as crowd the Quaker commonwealth, we must admit that the Swiss system produces results. The total training of the Swiss infantry soldier is sixty-five days the first year (seventy-five days for field artillery and ninety days for cavalry), and only eleven days a year for seven (eight in case of cavalry) succeeding years. The first reserve, or Landwehr, is called out only once, for eleven days’ service.

Thus the first training period of the Swiss infantry soldier is one hundred and forty-two days. Beyond this time he spends the eleven days mentioned in the Landwehr with his company and in addition there are certain inspections prescribed that bring the entire time of training up to one hundred and sixty-three days.

The military instruction of the Swiss recruit follows accepted lines and begins with periods of elementary training in what is commonly known as the “awkward squad.” The teaching is carried on much the same as at West Point with the fourth-classmen or with newly joined recruits in any of our National Guard organizations. The recruits arrive and are divided into companies, sections, squads under competent instructors. The training proceeds. The men are taught the facings, marching in single and double rank, and given a full course of setting-up exercises. For a month the men are grounded in the rudiments of squad and section drill. The manual of arms is taken up as soon as the recruit has mastered the simple marching maneuvers and the facings. All instruction is conducted out of doors, and from the beginning war conditions are simulated. Sometimes stress of weather makes indoor drilling necessary, but this is rare. Armory drilling is scorned in Switzerland. In barracks the men are taught to keep their kit clean, to assemble and take apart their rifles, pointing and aiming drill, the theory of shooting and the Swiss regulations. Besides these military duties, recruits are taught to cook and are given some notions of hygiene.

With the exception of Sunday, work goes on without interruption for eight hours each day.

The Swiss recruit begins his target practice as soon as he has shown he is able to handle his army rifle. Each recruit is allowed ninety blank and two hundred ball cartridges. A man is allowed to expend fifteen ball cartridges in preliminary shooting, eighty in individual practice, and one hundred and five in field war practice. As soon as the recruits are graduated from the “awkward squad” and commence company drills, they are taken on marches, which are gradually extended till the men can cover twenty-five miles without unusual fatigue and spend two nights in bivouac.

The whole purpose of military training in Switzerland is to approximate war conditions as nearly as possible. So it has been said with truth that the progress of training of the Swiss militia is exactly the reverse in theory and fact of that in operation with the militia in the United States. Actual work under war conditions being the end and aim of the Swiss system, and the time of training being so restricted, the instruction begins and ends in the open country. To quote from a report of a former military attaché, Major T. B. Mott, U.S.A.:

“After a thorough course in the school of the soldier and squad, work out in the open fields is begun and the recruit comes face to face with the primitive problems of a campaign and learns at the very start ‘what he is there for.’ He is taught to march correctly in column, form line and march in line, but these exercises are made an incident of going to and coming from ‘work.’ The real business of his life, he learns, is to march steadily under a heavy pack, shoot straight, take cover, and obey his squad leader.... The fifth and sixth weeks entire are spent on a long march in rough country, where the battalion acts for the most part as if in the presence of an enemy, maneuvering by day, establishing outposts at night, and conducting combat exercises with ball cartridges.

“The contrast between this sort of militia training and that seen in America or England is most marked. The psychological effect on the men is certainly important. The first conceptions of the real business of a soldier, his whole reason for existence, are apt to produce a lasting impression on a young man. In our (American) service the recruit’s first enthusiasms are concentrated (and dissipated) in the grind of barrack-yard drill, where no man need, or is expected to use his head. As these same recruits, whether fourth-class cadets or regular enlisted men, grow old in the service, and in turn have to instruct others, the ideas crystallized in them during their first training prevail, and instinctively they give importance to the things that have been most deeply impressed upon them....

“In Switzerland there are no parades or reviews or drills beyond the company or battalion ... through the push of stern necessity the Swiss has sifted out the absolute essentials to fitness for war, and these essentials, field exercises and good shooting, he works at to the exclusion of everything else.”

Such in outline is the Swiss plan; but there are certain factors and conditions in the Alpine nation that make the development of a national militia a much simpler proposition than, for example, would be the case in the United States. In the first place, the Swiss are a nation of patriots. Reference again to my dictionary brings out the fact that a patriot is a lover of his country. Not to make any invidious insinuations about the quality of patriotism in this or any other land, if I were the chief of the World’s Bureau of Political Statistics, and had to compile a comparative table of the patriotic qualities of the peoples of the earth, I should begin with the Swiss and work down. A lover of his country. The phrase does not half convey how the Swiss feels toward his lakes and mountains. Why, he regards them with passionate adoration. The Swiss is a super-patriot.

The next factor bearing largely upon the problem of speeding up the soldier-making plant is the physique of the raw material. Search as you may the Swiss vocabularies—French, German and Italian are the languages spoken—and you will find no term for molly-coddle. After spending some time in Switzerland I am convinced that both soil and climate preclude the cultivation of the said human species. Of course, imported varieties thrive in the steam-heated hotels perched on the sides of the mountains, but no indigenous specimens exist. At a guess I should rate the Swiss as the physical equals of the best human beings produced on this globe. You cannot live in Switzerland without taking exercise. The character of the terrain demands it. So, making a virtue of necessity, the average Swiss, boy and man, takes more general exercise than the upper-class Englishman.

Finally, the tradition of William Tell inspires the race. The Swiss are a nation of sharpshooters. Up to within fifty years the organic law of the land prohibited any male from taking unto himself a mate until he furnished proof that he owned a musket and convinced the authorities that he knew how to use it effectively. One of the first provisions of the Swiss Constitution decreed that every citizen must be ready to defend his country. Under this law, as soon as the state could afford it, every male in the Alpine nation was furnished a gun and ammunition. The ancient idea persists today. Every village has its rifle range. Consistently the descendants of William Tell have adopted target shooting as their national game. In these perilous times it is a more-to-be-recommended sport than baseball.

Taking it for granted that some of my readers have not heard the story, I give here a conversation which took place several years ago, when the Emperor of Germany was the guest of the President of the Swiss Republic. Wilhelm was in a waggish mood.

“What is the total fighting force, Mr. President, Switzerland could muster in an emergency?” asked the Emperor.

“Some five hundred thousand men at a pinch,” the Swiss President replied.

“So few!” exclaimed Wilhelm. Then, with a mischievous twinkle in his large eyes, he continued, “Why, I could send two and a half million men to attack Switzerland. What would happen then?”

The President answered, with a rather bored air:

“In that case, sire, I fear each Swiss soldier would have to expend five cartridges.”

If you have ever seen the Swiss shooting clubs in action you will know the President was no braggart.

I am firmly convinced that, instead of a rattle, the infant Switzer is given a miniature rifle. From earliest days his associations center round firearms and musketry practice. Be he the child of even the poorest peasant, his first recollections are of seeing his father cleaning and polishing a Swiss army rifle. That weapon is a household god. Sometimes, if he is good, the youngster may draw the oiled rag through the barrel during the cleaning process. He will trail his father to the village range. He will hear scores discussed, his father’s chances of winning a local prize, and how warmly his mother would welcome the prize money. His youthful experiences may include following the great federal shooting matches at Fribourg.

Imagine the sensations of the American boy if he could combine a week’s picnicking with a championship baseball game each day, and you will conjure up something of the feeling of the Swiss child when attending the great triennial shooting competition. The prize winners in the shooting contests fill the same niche in the Swiss small boy’s heart-shrine as Christy Mathewson does with the American youth. In a sentence, the whole population of Switzerland interests itself in shooting, and can shoot.

Thus, the raw material furnished, being one part patriot, one part physical fitness and one part sharpshooter, the problem of producing an army in Switzerland is readily solved. All that is necessary is some supplementary special training in team-work. Every American knows the significance of that word, and I do not hesitate to pronounce that the whole secret of an efficient army is compassed in the team-work idea.

When he is nineteen the young Swiss presents himself at the mayor’s office of his town and undergoes a rigid physical and moderate mental examination. If he passes the physical test, which includes running and walking endurance trials, and fails mentally, he is sent to night school until it is time to report for military training. Physical failure debars a man from service. Such a misfortune is considered almost a social calamity. The town belles have little time for those rejected on this count. The severity of the examination is attested by the fact that, out of approximately 40,000 young men who annually present themselves, 20,000, or 50 per cent, are rejected.

The following spring the accepted recruit receives notice directing him to report to the nearest training ground—there are eight scattered over Switzerland—and then he begins his sixty-five days’ work in the Recruit School. Here the tyro soldier is supplied with a uniform, complete accoutrements for field service, a rifle and ammunition. This equipment is his property until the end of his liability for military service. When not in use he keeps the complete outfit in his home.

This Swiss militia is a business army. From the first the recruit is trained under field conditions—no fancy manual-of-arms exercises in million-dollar armories; no reviews; no parades. The recruits devote a full eight-hour day to intensive training. All exercises take place out of doors. The corps of instructors, a specially trained staff, who perform their never-ending duties with religious idealism, cram more specific military instruction into a given time than is the case with any other army in the world. A fourth class-man at West Point—and he has few idle moments—has a sinecure compared with the Swiss recruit. Night work, long, fatiguing marches and trench digging bring no let-up in the usual eight-hour-day schedule of exercises. The men come through the course as lean as leopards. Perceptions are razor sharp. Faculties are on edge. This sixty-five-day period of concentrated military toil completed, the militiaman goes home. He has a solid foundation in all the duties of a soldier.

The annual eleven-day terms of instruction are picnics compared with the Recruit School. Of course, a man is assigned to his home company. The work begins with an inspection and company drill. For two days this instruction proceeds in all detail; then the men are marched to a point where three other companies are met, thus forming a battalion. Exercises for this larger unit continue for two or three days, when the battalion marches to a regimental camp. The same process is repeated until the company passes through brigade, division and corps training. Sometimes the work terminates with a march in field order. All this instruction takes place within eleven days. Under this system, supplemented by universal musketry practice, Switzerland turns out a force entirely competent for home defense in 142 days’ actual training.

Is national life affected by this training favorably or unfavorably? A Swiss would laugh if you asked him that question. Discounting the patriotism of the people, you have the answer when you know that the majority of Swiss citizens who have migrated to other countries, return each year for their military service. Democracy is never imperiled, for all officers are selected step by step from the ranks. I have seen General Wille, the commander-in-chief of the forces of Switzerland, in Berne, and no officer could possibly show less military swank.

Comparative figures on the efficiency of men who undergo the military training and those who do not are not always obtainable. Insurance actuaries figure that it adds an average of five years to a man’s life. Since the system was inaugurated, the work of the juvenile courts has perceptibly slackened. The training helps in the matter of obedience and orderliness, and this shows in every field of industry. It is the opinion of some of the big business men of Switzerland that the plan is responsible for the speeding up of all work in factories. The habit of concentration developed because of intensive training, according to a Zurich steel magnate, is a mental improvement that has indirectly solved some of the Alpine nation’s tremendous railroad engineering problems.

To avoid military training interfering with economic life, the men for the different arms in the Swiss service are selected largely according to previous occupation. Engineers are assigned to the engineer corps, telegraphers to the telegraph companies, young farmers to the cavalry, the mountain guides and climbers to the mountain artillery. So, in his training every advantage is taken of a recruit’s trade or profession, both to help the service and improve the man’s efficiency. This method tends to lessen the amount of special training required.

Another feature of the Swiss plan is an insurance issued by the State on behalf of every soldier, so he is covered from loss in case of accident in the line of peace service. Again, a common-sense measure is a present-day tax against the cost of future wars. For fifty years and more Switzerland has been accumulating a fund to pay the pensions resulting from any coming conflict. This sum now amounts to $4,000,000.

Though the budgets vary somewhat each year, it can be stated that the approximate expenditure of Switzerland on the army, annually, is $7,000,000. Practically all of this amount is expended upon the 150,000 troops of the first line. The reserve forces cost the State little or nothing for their upkeep.

The remarkable showing in cost is due to the fact that officers and men are paid only during periods of training, and then merely sums considered sufficient to cover living expenses. No table of payments to regular troops being in existence, the militia do not expect a professional salary. The highest officer in the army in time of peace, a colonel, gets $3.40 a day while on instruction service, and $4.00 a day in active duty. Under all circumstances the private receives the sum of 16 cents per day. Here is another proof of the patriotism of the Swiss. The American soldier costs the nation about thirty times as much as the militiaman of Switzerland. In contra-distinction, it might be said that the Swiss army is thirty times as effective as the American. And this is not due so much to universal liability to training as to the thoroughness with which the Swiss have worked out all the details to enable the forces to take the field at an instant’s notice. It has been the custom to say that republics never prepare sufficiently for war emergency in times of peace. Switzerland is the exception to this rule. Twice France has proved to be unequal to long-expected attack. In the United States the tendency is to leave all questions connected with the organization of military forces for settlement until the moment war is declared. Such is said to be the distinctive trait of democracies. If this be true, the day is not far distant when popular systems of government will cease to exist. The Swiss, who are a people of the most advanced type of democracy, find no menace in an army of half a million men. The mountain nation sees nothing undemocratic in arranging every detail of the work entailed in organizing against war; no infringement of the rights of the people in teaching them to be able to meet an adversary upon at least equal terms. In the last analysis, it is most important for a republic to train its citizens for defense, as they are the bulwark that fends the freedom of the democracy.

Switzerland needs no committee of boosters. It comes as near the Utopian democracy in its concept as will be found on this footstool of Providence. Here every fit male has rigorous military training; yet the country remains without a taint of militarism.

CHAPTER II
The German Military System

Military authorities agree that the German army organization surpasses all others. The present European war is the test that has demonstrated this fact. German national standards and American national standards are as far apart as the poles. The Prussian government scorns all democratic ideals and militarism pervades every cranny of the social structure. Notwithstanding these conditions, as we are searching for an ideal military system, we cannot afford to overlook the best the war has developed.

All who have given the subject any study have a general idea of the military demands made upon the German citizen. It may be well, however, to insert an epitome of the scheme in order to analyze it.

In Germany, military service is universal and compulsory, but before the present war there were many exemptions from duty with the colors. On his seventeenth birthday the young German was liable for the call, but actual military work never began until he reached his twentieth year. At forty-five his service ceased.

During these twenty-five years of liability for duty, the German compasses the entire gamut of military instruction. For seven years he trains with the first line, active, or what is commonly known as the standing army. The initial two years are spent in the ranks, where the recruit is grounded in every detail of the duties of the soldier. The instruction is imparted with a thoroughness equaled in no other army. There have been, also, undoubted cases of unnecessary severity. These are not the outcome of the system, but one of its evils, and form the exception rather than the rule. While the instruction is imparted with unusual strictness, it is policy to be just and, from the point of view of the German who has passed his whole life under restraint, the character of discipline employed is nothing extraordinary. From the strictly professional point of view the means are justified by the results. Frederick the Great himself could find few flaws in the German active army.

As the seeds of American military training were planted by a German, one who had served on the staff of Frederick the Great, we have a parallel by which we can gain some idea of the German period of instruction. The German system works along the same lines as those pursued in the Regular Army in the United States, with this exception: in the United States the recruit is encouraged to do some of his own thinking; in Germany he is never expected to think. In Germany the instruction is given under the strictest conditions conceivable. Once the soldier joins his company, he is assigned a number and his bed in barracks and thereafter he becomes as a cog in a great machine. While the preliminary training follows the accepted lines, it is more thorough and more exacting than the course of instruction in any other army. In addition to his marching, drilling and purely military work, the soldier does all the manual labor about the barracks. Of course, the soldiers do their own cooking and tailoring, they also perform all the “domestic” service of the barracks and the many demands incident to the upkeep of a large army post. The routine of the day begins with the cleaning-up of quarters and an inspection. Then the drilling is taken up and continued practically without break until noon. Various instruction will be undertaken in the afternoons, its character depending upon the season of the year. More time is spent on actual individual instruction than in any other army, and no man is graduated out of the awkward squad until he is perfect in the details of his work.

The soldier is under absolute restraint while in barracks and he can only leave his quarters with permission. His amusements and pleasures are limited and, of course, he must wear his uniform on all occasions.

The German passes through the ordinary instruction of squad, section, company and battalion during his first year service and as soon as the period for Grand Maneuvers arrives he is supposed to be well enough instructed to carry his pack and perform the trying test of that time without breaking down. These maneuvers take place during the summer at some of the various grounds scattered over Germany. The Kaiser maneuvers, when the whole of Germany’s fighting strength is assembled, are the climax of the German soldiers’ career.

During his instruction period the German recruit finds that he is happier if he performs his many duties letter perfect. And it goes much better with him if he fits himself in with the system and its prejudices. While he is in the army, his spirit is being moulded to ideals that are the foundation of the German Empire.

Following the two-year period, when all is subordinated to military training and the German citizen gives his complete time and thought to the army, he passes into the reserve for five years, where he still belongs to his corps and is obliged to join it twice for two terms of training, limited by law to eight weeks. In custom these periods seldom lasted more than a month or six weeks. The length of service in the cavalry and artillery is somewhat longer.

The next stage of the German’s military life is passed with the first “Ban” of the second line army or Landwehr. Liability for this duty lasts five years. During these years the Landwehr men are called out twice for war maneuvers, serving from eight to fourteen days on each occasion. This ends his active military instruction. The German citizen is assigned to the second Ban of the Landwehr until he has completed his thirty-ninth year, where no special training is required.

The Landsturm is the final stage of the German’s military life. This organization is nominally a home guard of all men from forty to forty-five years of age who have passed through the prescribed course of training in the army. Besides these men, the enrolment of the Landsturm includes the untrained subjects of the Kaiser between thirty-nine and forty-five. Properly, this elderly contingent is the second division of the home guard. The first division takes in all the citizens of the Empire between the ages of seventeen and thirty-nine who, for one reason or another, received no military training. Enrolling such units in the Landsturm keeps before all citizens the fact of duty for defense of the Fatherland. There are many ways in which a citizen may serve his country besides fighting in the front-line trenches.

Other categories of reserves are organized, the most important being the Ersatz, which is composed of young men about twenty years old physically and mentally fit for service, but in excess of the numbers normally needed to complete the peace time strength of the standing army. The Ersatz, undergoes three terms of training of ten, six and four weeks respectively. When the German army mobilized in July, 1914, many of the youths volunteered for duty with the colors, while the rest were mustered into service with fully trained reserves. A part of the Ersatz is assigned non-combatant duties.

Leaving out of consideration the demands of present war conditions, Germany with a population of over 66,000,000 had over 1,000,000 citizens present themselves for service each year. About fifty per cent were rejected on various counts. Of the remainder, 250,000 were actually drafted for duty with the colors.

That a man is rejected does not mean that he is entirely unfitted for military duty. In the German service, of all who presented themselves, only the best are chosen. (I refer, of course, to conditions before the present war.) It has been found that in the scheme of the organization of the German army, 250,000 recruits are all that can be effectively handled each year, so a selection is made out of all who present themselves under the yearly call, and the rest are excused. Of the number actually rejected as unfit, a large proportion belong to the class defective in eyesight.

Scrutinizing this program of military work, we see that the economic life of the ordinary citizen is actually interrupted during a two-year period. The secondary training terms are actually vacations for the hard-working German. The whole business and industrial life of the Empire is organized to meet the demands of these interruptions. Notice is always given in good time when the reserves of the active army are to be called for their supplementary period of service, and the large and small industrial organizations throughout the Empire take the necessary measures to adjust themselves to the loss of time involved. It has been found in practice that the actual working efficiency of an employee is improved by these short absences from work.

When the German citizen has passed into the Landwehr and the Landsturm, the short periods of training required of him have no appreciable effect upon the economical life of the Empire. So, although the German system looks very formidable, through the statement that a man is liable for service for a period of twenty-five years, an examination of his service shows that he devotes only two uninterrupted years to military training.

It is no easy matter to introduce an outsider into a sort of camera obscura where the German viewpoint on militarism will be revealed. In Prussia the content of the word is an inheritance passed on to the whole German people by Frederick the Great. Yes, the germ of the idea was planted by the Great Elector when Prussia was a minor principality of little more importance in Europe at the time than Paraguay is in South America today. Any German will tell you, with sincerest conviction, that the strength—and he means the wealth—of the nation is the blossoming offshoot of the military tree. Disinterested political economists partly agree with this contention. The men brought up in the German ideal cannot see, and will not admit it has unlovely sides. Far from having a warping effect on the mind, the subject of the Kaiser firmly believes the intellectual standard of Germany is founded on military training. In a conversation with a German reserve officer in Berlin during the early months of the war, I got the Teuton argument in a sentence. “The Army is the poor man’s University.” Anyone who has made a study of the German system must agree in large measure with this dictum. My informant, who had spent several years in the United States and knew our prejudices, went on to explain:

“In the army our citizen receives the cheapest, most thorough and scientific education of its kind known to pedagogy. His mind is trained. His muscles are trained. His spirit is trained. After two years he is a complete mental, physical and moral entity.”

It was a broad statement, but, allowing for native enthusiasm, accurate. The officer paused as if seeking in his mind a concrete expression of his argument.

“The goose step!” His eyes lighted at the words. “Let me tell you a secret: German soldiers enjoy the ‘goose step.’ It is the outward sign of their devotion to an ideal. Psychologists will assure you that when a man has complete control of his muscles—such control as develops in army work—his mental efficiency is enormously increased. But this is not news to you. You have seen it with your own recruits. Nicht wahr?”

I was constrained to admit that my observation, to a certain degree, bore out his statements, but I could not allow that this result could only be accomplished in military training.

“Would that those who criticize our German system could see some of the concrete results. Take men from the mountains of Silesia. Many do not know their right hand from their left. They cannot read or write. The word cleanliness is absent from their vocabulary. As your poet said, they are brothers to the ox. After two years’ hammering (this is a quotation) ‘the peasant is transformed. He has learned to read and write. He is clean, orderly, punctual, obedient, a credit to the Empire.’ Such is the pernicious result of militarism!”

Passing to generalities, my companion continued:

“In the army the people are welded into one efficient national machine, a highly trained social machine, with all its component parts working toward a common end—the German Ideal.”

Of course, this was an officer stating his views; but he was not a regular, only a reserve, and so not wholly tainted with the professional habit of mind; in fact, I found practically the same view of the effect of military training to be general throughout Germany. Bankers, merchants, artisans—all agreed that the greatness of the German Empire was firmly planted on the compulsory plan of service. When this is the consensus of opinion of practically an entire population who have tested the plan, the idea merits some hard thinking.

There are Germans who condemn the system of conscription. They are a minority so small that finding one is like hunting through oyster shells for pearls. The Socialists, as a party, oppose compulsory service. However, you must use a microphone to hear any criticism under present conditions. Dr. Karl Liebknecht, whom the German press would like to label as a bad boy of the Reichstag, is unutterably opposed to war and all the pomp, pageantry and prostration incident thereto. His effusions on the subject fill several handy volumes of the Reichstag Record. He feels so strongly on the point that once, on a “seeing-the-front party” where I was a guest, this distinguished statesman for a long time refused to appear on the same film in a war writers’ group because some “feldgrau Pickelhauben”[A] filled the background. As his colleagues, we insisted he should take the center. He consented; but when one of the officers, without a smile, politely invited Herr Liebknecht to join an exclusive military group he intimated that to do so would insure something worse than eternal damnation. And Liebknecht is elected regularly. Ernest Meyer, the plodding editor of Vorwaerts, is also anti-militarist.

[A] Field-gray helmets.

The German military instructor has not the same material to work with as is found in Switzerland. Though the educational plan adopted includes first-class physical instruction in public schools, it is natural that general results, in so large a population, could not be so good as in the smaller country. Yet this fault is cured in the army.

Again, the army is the economic ally of German industrialism. When a butcher, a baker, a barber, is enrolled he takes his place in the specific department of the organization for which his training fits him; and then and there his industrial efficiency advances. He is taught to be a clean and saving butcher. As a baker he is taught the chemistry of dough, in addition to practical bread making. The barber becomes a rapid-fire artist. All learn the vital lesson of hygiene as reflected in their special trades. It is unnecessary to multiply examples. The same principles hold with shoemakers, farriers, tailors, carpenters. In after life it is always the artisan who has completed his two years’ service who gets the most work in his village.

There can be no quarrel with the results produced on the individuals by army training. The salient fact that merits criticism is the domination of national existence by military principles. The army is a fetish in Germany. The school-boy, on his way to his lessons, packs his books like a knapsack. Throughout his whole educational régime he is under a discipline only little less exacting than that which he will encounter in the army. Germany prides itself upon discipline. As a broad discussion of it would only lead to the questions of exaltation or the suppression of individual effort, it finds no place here. When it comes to a choice, however, between the controlled agent and the uncontrolled in any sphere of life, there can be no disagreement. The German system must be judged from the German point of view, and not from the American.

One of the factors that has contributed more than others to the spread of military standards throughout Germany is the government ownership of railroads. The railroads are such an important part of a nation’s existence that any plan controlling them is sure to have an effect upon the people at large. The great German general staff, very rightly, consider the railroads as the first factor of the plan of national defense. Consequently, they must be at all times under military control. In no other manner would it be possible for German army administration to mobilize in the necessarily short time Germany’s geographical position demands. In time of peace, the railways are nominally under civilian control; this is theory and not fact. The heads of railway administration have rank in the army, and they understand perfectly what their immediate duties would be upon the declaration of war. So in gradation, from the highest officials down to the most insignificant brakeman, the whole railway personnel is organized on the military plan.

The tremendous advantage which this plan has given Germany will not be entirely revealed until long after the existing war is concluded. We can see the reflections of it, however, in the extraordinary capacity of German commanders for moving their forces over the most extensive areas in the shortest possible time.

With this symbol of militarism working through the daily life of the German—in the manner that railroad transportation is bound to do—it is readily understood how the essence of the evil tinctures the whole social structure. It goes without saying that the upper class in Germany stimulates domination by every means. They are very careful, however, to avoid all apparent injustice in this control, and assiduously foster the thought that it is only through a complete surrender of individual rights that the whole nation can advance to its ultimate destiny. Many of the pretentions of the Germans that have appeared outrageously presumptuous to other peoples are but expressions of this thought. And here we get the clue to the fallacy of the whole German system. It is militarism gone mad.

The many excellencies that result from military training are prostituted to unworthy ends. The essential fault of the soldier—vanity—has been emphasized and developed until it has become a national disease. It is from this seed that the German mania for impressing their standards of “kultur” upon the rest of the world has sprung.

From what proceeds it is easy to see how a discussion of the army plan in Germany leads to an analysis of the whole German political system; and would, if carried further, bring us face to face with the controversy of autocracy versus democracy. Nothing can be gained here from carrying the argument to such lengths. We wish to learn what to avoid in the German scheme, while selecting such excellencies as would fall in with American traditions and ideals.

Impartial observers are wont to state that America errs as much on the side of individual liberty as Germany does in the repression thereof. Obviously, no comprehensive design for military organization can be put into effect without the curtailment of personal freedom. In the United States we want to make this curtailment a voluntary sacrifice on the part of the individual. No citizen worthy of the name should hesitate to surrender, of his own accord, what he is disposed to consider an inalienable right, when he is convinced that in so doing he insures the safety of the nation. The sacrifices made by the German people are in response to the demand of the Kaiser, who is the sovereign. In like manner, American citizens must make similar sacrifices—modified, however, by altered conditions—for each individual citizen possesses in himself the attributes of sovereignty. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to study this German plan, which has proved itself under the severest tests of war, and select therefrom what is necessary and suitable to national self-defense.

There is no possibility of our adopting any system tainted with militarism. When all is said and done, the greatest evil of what we classify under that term is the military caste. We must never have a military caste in the United States. The reader does not have to be reminded that the present American organization is an inheritance from Baron Frederick von Steuben, and is based upon a Prussian foundation. In a later chapter, a suggestion for modifying the system of educating officers for the army will be put forth. There is no real reason why the American youth who feels impelled to choose the military profession should not seek a congenial and moderately profitable existence in the army. With our American common-sense as a safeguard, there is very little likelihood of such an American developing into the sabre-clanking “Hauptmann.”

A detailed study of all the ramifications of the German military system belongs to the province of the professional soldier; not to the civilian. Daily, more and more data are coming to hand, throwing light upon the working, under the test of war, of the German organization.

This review of military conditions in Germany cannot be concluded without a statement of the cost of a peace army of 616,000 men. The military expenditure of the German Empire entered in the budget for 1914-15 amounted to $217,000,000. That such an enormous and complex organization can be financed for this moderate sum is the most important lesson to be learned from Germany.

CHAPTER III
The French Military System

It is as true now as it was in Napoleon’s heyday of triumph that the poilu carries a potential marshal’s baton in his haversack. This is the keystone of the French defense scheme. And by a curious paradox—for the project first emerged from the brain of a hyperautocrat—it has molded the soldiers of France into a completely democratic army. By way of parenthesis, my opinion is that our home-grown fighting force might be more representative if encouragement were freely given the American private soldier to aspire after a general’s stars.

To return to the French, their method, briefly sketched, is as follows: Service in the national—or, as it is called, metropolitan—army is compulsory for every French citizen, except such as show they are hopelessly unfit physically. No other exemptions are considered. From the age of twenty to forty-eight all Frenchmen are part of the army. The last law—1913—on the subject decreed service with the active force in the ranks, continued for three years—from the twentieth to the completed twenty-third year. For eleven more years the Frenchman was classed as a reserve, and after a seven years’ enlistment in the territorial force his liability to serve ended with seven years in the territorial reserve. Reservists for the active army turn out twice in the eleven years for maneuvers that last about four weeks for each period. The territorial army trains once for two weeks. The reserve of this force is never called for training.

Though the French army has certain points in common with the German, actually they are as wide apart as the poles. The two systems split on the rock of officer caste.

I shall never forget the shock all my preconceived military ideas sustained when first I saw the French army in action. It was in the early days of this war. I had literally been sitting down on the banks of the Meuse while two divisions of the Germans and French were fighting it out overhead for the possession of the bridge that crosses the river under the cliffs at Dinant. The night of the second day of the engagement, having a premonition of what was coming, I executed a strategic retirement to a nearby village.

It was a raw, rainy night. The village inn was a two-room shack. One room served as office, lounge and bar—principally bar. The other was the bedrooms. The plural is what I mean. When you made known your preferences it mattered not whether you wished a sunny southern exposure or a quiet corner on a court; you were shown to “the bedroom”—not all of it, just a straw-strewn section thereof.

Outside, what seemed to me to be the whole French army was rumbling past in boulevard motor busses. In the lounge-office-bar I made myself as inconspicuous as possible. Members of the divisional artillery staff, from general down, were the only officers present at the moment. A technical discussion was in progress. There was nothing odd in that, for of all the military species, the artilleryman is the most argumentative. But what opened my eyes to the popping point was the manner in which a major—a mere major!—talked back to the general.

What have since become the famous “75’s” were then being tried out. The point in dispute was purely professional and is outside my story. The astonishing part of the duologue was the vehement manner assumed by the major toward his superior. He strode up and down, gesticulating. He harangued “his” general—all superiors are addressed in the possessive in France—in the tone of a stump speaker. The discussion was largely technical, but I gathered enough to understand that the emphatic major would get the decision if the matter were left to an unprejudiced referee.

Frankly I expected the general to call for a couple of the largest and fiercest gendarmes in the vicinity and send the major back as far as Bordeaux in arrest for disrespect to a superior. Instead, Mon General mildly argued with his subordinate and held that the functions of the divisional artillery precluded the course of action advocated. That was all that happened. One or two of the other officers seemed slightly interested, but the rest took the affair as a matter of course.

Ten years in the Federal prison at Leavenworth would be about the court-martial sentence of that major if he disputed with a superior in our service. In Germany they would not even wait for dawn to shoot him.

Before the night was over I was to get another surprise. The rain came down as if a deluge scheduled for Philippine service had been switched into that part of Belgium. Now the Hotel Hut began to absorb blue-and-red soldiers as a sponge does water. Actually, the two rooms were sopping with privates. I remember the raindrops in the flickering lamplight glistening like diamonds on their rough blue coats.

Officers filtered in as well; one tall azure dragoon, with his helmet crowned with horse-hair, gave a striking touch to the bizarre scene. And all, from field officer to private, mingled in what from a professional viewpoint would be designated easy familiarity. With amazement I saw all ranks stand at the bar and swallow their bocks. For a United States officer to be seen at a bar where privates drink would bring swift reprimand, if not court-martial.

I reveled in the wonder of the scene—the “real thing” in that sudden cataclysm, the War of Europe; but all the time I kept questioning myself on the apparent passing up of discipline in the French army. The whole foundation was pushed out from under my army experience, and my military notions tumbled about me like a child’s house of blocks, when I went into the bedrooms. Spread over the floor, without distinction of rank or birth, were as many Frenchmen as the room could hold. Patrician and poilu all snored in happy accord. Lulled to sleep by the sonorific nasal chorus that lifted gently to the rafters, I concluded that, so far as the army was involved, the French ideals—Liberté! Fraternité! and Egalité!—were no idle dreams.

In that little low-ceilinged, lamp-lit room the secret of the French system was made clear to me. It was unconscious idealism. It was not the conventions of the service that knit those Frenchmen into the peculiar fabric of an army, where in time of stress the distinction of rank might be ignored without imperiling discipline. Back in the mind of every man in that room was the thought: “We are all fighting for France.” Even though it is the custom to bury the officers in separate graves, none knows better than the Frenchman that, certainly in death, president and private are equal.

France is a nation of paradoxes—the war has proved this statement; and from the soil of empire we get an equality that needs no violent assertion to prove its existence. Universal service in a large measure accounts for this phenomenon. America owes a great debt to France. Should it happen that we get a hint from the French which will help solve our defense problem, the debt will be doubled.

Since my first experience I have had many others showing this curious attitude of officer toward private in the French army. I am convinced that it is the mainspring of French strength today. Actually I believe General Joffre’s troops know more war lore this minute than any of their allies or opponents. The confidence existing between the captain and his company has brought this about.

For instance, there was a case where a French common soldier had an idea—no uncommon thing with Gallic common soldiers. The idea was concerned with an improvement in bomb throwers. He took the notion to his officer. “We’ll try him, mon vieux!” Imagine any other type of officer calling a private “Old Boy”!

Together they went to work with the enthusiasm of artists. Shortly the contraption was rigged. The whole company gathered in a corner of the trench to watch the début of the machine. All was ready. Then the muffled snap of a spring and fifty pounds of explosive were silently wafted into the midst of a startled band of Bosches. Such was the origin of the noiseless bomb-thrower, today one of the most important articles of furniture in any trench.

What economic effect army training has had in France is difficult to specify. You know the Socialists waged an unremitting war on the institution before the present crisis. The army was considered the foe of labor. In France that argument is forever closed. The instinct of self-defense is stronger than all minor economic considerations.

It is contended by some that the sporting revival in France is indirectly the result of universal training. Certainly the statistics show an advance in the national physical standard. How this training helps in all industrial effort has been dwelt on in describing the results in Switzerland and Germany. The same generalizations apply to France. But the real worth of the military work lies in the national spirit developed. The morale of the race, nursed in the camps and barracks, gives today what some glibly call a regenerated nation. If France is regenerated she has her army to thank for this birth of new life.

When you see the defenders of France in the trenches, where every element is fighting to break their spirits, and contemplate the insouciance with which they meet the dregs of discomfort, wounds, and death, you realize that her sons are citizen soldiers in the ideal distinctions of the term. Then another truth dawns on you: Out of solidarity of service France has found her soul.

The principle of conscription has long been accepted in France and it is of interest to trace the course of this method of raising armies in the nation that gave the republican idea to Europe.

At the outset of the Revolutionary period, voluntary enlistments rallied all necessary recruits to the republican flag. Later, it became necessary to impress upon the citizens the duty to serve the country. The convention that ruled France before the advent of Napoleon, first issued the fiat, “The service of the country is a civic and general duty.” Later, the revolutionary government of 1793 issued a decree which declared that until the enemies of the republic were driven from the territory of France, all Frenchmen were liable for military service. In the language of the document, “The young men will go to battle, the married men will forge weapons, and transport stores, the women will make tents and clothes, serve in the hospitals, while the children will prepare bandages.” Surely this was the true principle of the “nation in arms.” In the present war the divisions of the people fill the functions prescribed in the ancient document.

It was not necessary to take the number of men available, so the annual contingent was fixed according to the wastage. Recruits were drawn by lot and some came forward for voluntary enlistment.

This method was continued during the Napoleonic wars, but with the waning of the great Corsican’s fortunes it became more and more difficult to obtain the annual drafts.

After the fall of the Empire the principle of conscription was allowed to lapse. At the time of the Restoration it again came into force and continued for about twenty years. Once more the scheme went out of practice and was not resumed until just previous to the war of 1870. But it was too late to bring a sufficient force into being before the country was overrun by the enemy.

After the tragic lessons of that war, successive French governments tried to build up a national army on the old republican lines that every citizen owed service to the state. Originally the term of service was five years, then three, then two and finally just before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, restored to three years again.

The present law not only lengthened the period of training with the active army, but established absolute equality for all citizens under the call to arms. Previous legislation had tampered with the principle of conscription and created a large class of privileged citizens who only served twelve months with the colors. In self-defense, the Third Republic went back to the old theory of universal service and forbade any exemptions, save for complete physical disability.

The peace strength of the French standing army in 1914 was 790,000. In organization it followed the usual lines with slight modifications. The reserve troops form divisions corresponding to those of the first line. Thus there is available in time of war what amounts to a second army of the same organization as the regular force. A similar plan is put into practice with the territorial army. It cannot be said that these third line troops are in any way as effective as the first or second. In actual conflict these forces would be of value only in holding lines of communications and remote depots of supplies.

The colonial army which forms a distinct part of the French defense line is an auxiliary force of high military value. It has proved itself in the European war. It is distinct from the metropolitan army and consists partly of white and partly of native troops. The colonials are recruited, for the most part, by voluntary enlistment, or by voluntary transfers from the metropolitan army, but in West Africa, compulsion can be called into effect if enough volunteers do not come forward. The famous foreign legion is a part of the colonial army.

The last peace budget put the cost of the French army per year at almost $250,000,000. This includes the expenses of the colonial army with certain sums spent upon armament. Actual upkeep of the standing forces would be $240,000,000 per annum.

CHAPTER IV
The Australian Military System

The problem of defense in Australia is in many ways identical with that of the United States. In the island commonwealth a constitution exists modeled on the lines of that governing the union. National development in the antipodes has, in some degree, followed the course pursued in America. But from the inception of the commonwealth, the question of defense has been in the minds of the people and their chosen or appointed administrators.

The circumstances governing the present system grew out of conditions like to those that prevail in the United States. Australia originally depended for defense upon a regular establishment, small in number, and a force of militia. These were supplemented by rifle associations of problematic value, and by school battalions. In the military evolution of the country the latter have been a vital factor.

Previous to the establishment of the commonwealth, Australia depended upon Great Britain for the necessary measures of protection. It would seem to have been the policy of past English administrators to foster this state of dependence, under the opinion that such action reinforced loyalty to the mother land. Today all this is changed. Australia is self-governing and self-reliant. While strong in its devotion to Britain, as shown by the enormous sacrifices made in the present war, the commonwealth has cut the leading strings and now works out its destiny unaided.

The Defense Act of 1903-1909 of Australia was the first law passed in any English-speaking country which recognized the principle of universal liability of citizens to military training in time of peace. The introduction of the statute met with hearty approval. Its provisions went into effect in 1911 and since that date Australia has steadily advanced in military efficiency. The remarkable feature of the system is the little time actually devoted to training, compared to the excellent results attained. The worth of the Australian militiaman has stood the acid test of war. In no field of the world fighting did soldiers of whatever nationality show higher military qualities than possessed by the Australian corps which fought so long and determinedly in Gallipoli. A system achieving these splendid results in such a short time merits close study by all interested in the question of citizen soldiery.

After the Australian Parliament passed the defense act, it immediately invited Lord Kitchener to visit the island, examine local conditions and make recommendations. This businesslike proceeding produced a militia organization which stands as a model to the world. The results are all the more noteworthy when we consider that the Australian is, if possible, more individualistic than the American. It has been proved that there is nothing basically antagonistic between submitting to necessary military training and enjoying complete political liberty. The antipodean is as jealous of his “rights” as the range rider of the western United States, yet he submits to discipline to serve his country.

As the pioneer nation favoring universal service, Australia found many difficulties in her path. In the first place, her area was great, about 3,000,000 square miles, enclosed in a coast fine of more than 12,000 miles. (The United States coast line is 20,000 miles and continental area 3,616,000 square miles.) Over this area a population of nearly 5,000,000 was unequally distributed, the greater portion living within 300 miles of the eastern, southern and western coast of the island, with more than one-third of the aggregate inhabiting the five principal cities of the commonwealth. The United States has a population distribution of the same type, but on a highly exaggerated scale.

The system of training brought into force in Australia was no radical departure from what had gone before. It was the simple extension of the existing militia and cadet system to include all those who were physically fit instead of limiting membership to volunteers. From this seed, which had been germinating for twenty years, grew up the present successful plan.

The Australian Defense Act of 1903, largely amended, imposed a system of compulsory training, on all fit males beginning with cadets of twelve to eighteen years of age, followed by one year in the citizen forces as recruits, after which the men remained as soldiers for seven years. Liability ceases with the completion of the twenty-sixth year, but men are expected to join the rifle clubs which are established all over the island and keep up their shooting. The actual period of military training is exceedingly short. The time required of the young citizen soldiers from eighteen to twenty-six years being only sixteen days in each year. Of this period eight days must be passed in camp in continuous training.

Compared with European requirements, this is excessively limited, but because of the ardor of the cadets, and the fact that shooting is a national pastime in Australia, the ends are out of all proportion to time expended.

The whole country is divided into recruiting districts, ninety-two in number, of approximately equal population, each district providing one infantry battalion. When the system is in full operation it is estimated that the total number of men under training will be 150,000 cadets and 120,000 citizen soldiers. Antedating the outbreak of war in 1914, the Australian militia totaled 50,000 in all ranks. In addition to these there were 90,000 undergoing training as senior cadets. Also about 50,000 were registered in the rifle clubs.

The former militia and volunteer units were gradually merged into the new citizen army. When complete this will consist of 23 infantry brigades (92 battalions), 28 regiments of light horse, 49 field and 7 heavy batteries (4 guns each), and 14 companies of engineers with the necessary departmental troops. In event of attack, about half of the force would be required to garrison and defend the ports while the remainder would form a mobile operating army.

When the plan is in full working order, after eight or nine years, it is expected the cost will be about $15,000,000.

Such in brief is the Australian scheme.

In order to emphasize the very small time period required in this system the training of Australians is here tabulated:

Rank.

Age,
Years.

Service,
Years.

Training.

Junior Cadets

12-14

2

90 hours each year.

Senior Cadets

14-18

4

4 full days, 12 half days,
24 quarter (night) drills
each year.

Citizen forces (militia)

18-26

8

In first seven years drills
equaling 16 full days, of
which 8 must be in camp,
every year.

Artillery and engineers and naval recruits train for twenty-five days, of which seventeen are spent in camp. From the above it is seen that the Australian system is founded upon the training of the youth of the country. Let us examine the three stages of instruction for boys and young men in Australia, under separate heads. The purpose of the different periods of schooling are.

First, in the junior cadets, to systematize physical drills and marching exercises in conjunction with school duties and thus improve bodily development. This plan was found of peculiar advantage to the city-bred boy.

Second, with the senior cadets, between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, while continuing the physical development, to initiate a general military training that would lighten subsequent recruit instruction.

Third, in the militia, men between eighteen and twenty-five years of age, to organize, train and discipline a force of real fighting value. In Australia, as in the United States, primary education is compulsory and free. In most of the antipodean states children remain at school up to fourteen years of age. Schools are found in even thinly populated districts and three-fourths of the children of the country attend the same. The other fourth attend private schools. The commonwealth government has no authority over education, which, as it is in the United States, is a function of the state government. But the central government has power to require training for military purposes in all schools. It was no difficult task to introduce military instruction in the schools, as, before the passage of the defense act, volunteer cadet corps existed in primary institutions of learning. These numbered some 30,000 students and have passed on their name, junior cadets, to the present organizations.

Although Australia is a young country, the effect of the crowding into the cities has already been marked among the youth of the land. A sharp difference is noted between the city- and the country-bred boy. So this physical training is a national asset, even though many of the boys who train, afterwards fail to come up to the high standard set for entrance into the militia. In the schools all cadets are examined medically before being subject to the fatigues of military exercise.

As the commonwealth government had no power to legislate military instruction into existence as an added burden to the schoolmasters, it had to be accepted voluntarily. In recompense the central administration made grants to schools meeting the government requirements. All the schools are now conducting the training. Teachers undertake a special course in order to fit themselves for the work.

The training consists of not less than fifteen minutes each day devoted to physical exercises and a short time occupied in marching drill, which, in practice, is infantry squad drill. In addition, the cadet can choose two of the following subjects as part of his military course:

1. Miniature rifle shooting.

2. Swimming.

3. Running exercises in organized games.

4. First aid to the wounded.

From the above schedule it is easily understood that the cadet training of ninety hours per year is one of the popular courses of the schools.

What the junior cadets look forward to during the whole of their period of apprenticeship is the date of their fourteenth birthday, when they become seniors. The two titles come down from the days of the Roman republic, when the young men of that nation espoused military training in order to fit themselves for war. The Australian senior cadet forms part of his country’s military system. A pride and glow of patriotism fills his breast when first he dons his uniform. Then he receives his “Record Book” in which will be written the history of his military life, he is allotted arms and accoutrements and assigned to a company. It is safe to say that the young Australian experiences much the same feelings as did the novitiate knight of old when first he donned armor and lifted spear.

Now the cadet comes under military discipline. Companies are as a rule 120 strong, including three officers, five sergeants and four corporals. Nothing more complicated than company evolutions are attempted in the way of drill, which includes the manual of arms. At times, the companies are formed into battalions for some ceremonial and this gives added zest to the training. As the boys enter into their work with all the enthusiasm of youth, they soon attain a proficiency that approaches the drilling of West Point cadets in the United States. In the outlying districts, the cadet companies recruited in the remote grazing country are remarkable for the physique of the members. Nevertheless, battalions formed in city areas respond rapidly to systematic physical instruction, and show sharp improvement in body, in mentality and in morality at the end of the course.

The introduction to military training is continued for four years. At the end of that time, when the senior cadet reaches his eighteenth year, he is brought before the medical officer of his training area for examination. He is then classified as either first, fit; second, conditionally fit; third, temporarily unfit; fourth, unfit; fifth, not substantially of European origin or descent. According to his classification he does or does not enter the established militia.

As recently as 1912 service in the militia of Australia was voluntary. The period of engagement was three years and implied the right to resign under certain contingencies. The militiaman who attended a minimum number of parades, equal to twelve full days’ training, was declared efficient. The only penalty for non-efficiency was discharge. Officers were selected from citizens in or outside the militia force without any previous qualification. From the above it can be gathered that the standard of training was unfortunately low. In order not to inaugurate too radical a departure from past conditions when the defense act went into effect, old militia units were continued in existence, and while their internal organization was interfered with as little as possible, they were brought up to an improved standard.

In addition new units were created, and these include many old members. Here a distinct alteration in constitution has been effected. Old members are not usually re-engaged after the completion of their current enlistment. This provision is probably put forward in order to break with some of the past traditions. Non-commissioned officers, however, are encouraged to re-enlist.

Classes report annually at one date, usually July 1st, and when their eight-year service is complete the class is mustered out as a body. As already stated, for the first seven years all the members of the class must undergo military training not less than sixteen whole days annually. Efficiency is determined at a yearly test, and militiamen found not to be up to standard must undergo longer service. Promotion in all classes is from the ranks and is based on merit. In normal times about 20,000 senior cadets become liable to training in the militia every year. This number may be expected to increase as the population of Australia grows.

Musketry instruction is a special feature of the militiaman’s training and is carried out along the same general lines pursued in the British army. Rifle ranges are located within a few miles of all the training localities. In the mounted services, which are very popular in Australia, the cavalryman citizen soldier supplies his own mount. This simple device relieves the commonwealth government of a large item of expenditure. On the other hand, the field artillery batteries are supplied with government horses obtained and maintained especially for the purpose. Australia has a stock of 2,250,000 horses of all types, so there is little difficulty in supplying the militia needs in the open market. However, it is proposed to establish a large government stud farm and breed a uniform type of artillery horse.

Results of universal liability to military training in Australia can thus be summarized:

Prior to the year 1909 there had been a steadily growing feeling in Australia that the 25,000 available militia was entirely insufficient for local defense. The Federal Government, after careful study, discovered that it was in no financial condition to increase the military forces on the same lines and at the same rates of pay as then in force. To expand the militia to 120,000 would have meant an outlay far too great in proportion to revenues, and it was also deemed impossible, even if the money were available, to bring the citizen force up to this strength through voluntary enlistment.

Neither was it thought that under the old standard of instruction the increased numbers would produce increased efficiency. Soldiering, as then conducted, would often operate to the disadvantage of the patriotic militiaman because of the short-sightedness of his employer. Men lost their jobs for going to camp, resignations which were allowable were frequent, and thus it was considered that even if it were possible to continue the volunteer enlistments, the average length of service would be curtailed.

To wipe out the citizen forces already existing, which cost so much for the result obtained, and to increase the regular forces to a new war establishment, would have given a very good fighting machine. Because of its cost, and the prejudice of the Australians against a large regular army, such a scheme was rejected. Between these two extremes the new system has been evolved.

CHAPTER V
The English Military System

In event of a great war the United States would suffer the same military experience as England. The positions and policy of the two countries are somewhat analogous and our military course has been shaped along lines that closely follow the English system. For this reason, the change brought about in military matters in the British Empire, under pressure of war, is of especial interest to Americans.

I do not hesitate to say the First Hundred Thousand, as they are now designated—the expeditionary army England sent to Flanders and France in August, 1914—as a fighting force—has never been excelled. The battalions were professional soldiers. Their training had been practical. Their equipment was excellent. Their physical condition superb. What added highly to the effectiveness of these battalions was the standard of marksmanship maintained in the English army. The splendid shooting ability of the British soldiers saved them from annihilation. The discipline that had become part of their nervous reactions made it possible for them to carry out with small loss, a retreat that has since become historic. Superior numbers overwhelmed the British at Mons and Le Cateau. Yet, despite two severe defeats, the army was extricated from an almost impossible situation and suffered no deterioration in morale. In the same predicament, any save highly trained and efficient units would have probably repeated the famous maneuver of the Northern army at the battle of Bull Run.

The fact that stands out in this initial campaign is, the finest type of professional soldiers were defeated by superior numbers of trained citizen battalions. Man for man, I do not consider that the German troops of the first line equaled, in soldierly qualities, the British army forced back in Belgium. German officers are more professional than English and the invaders had a smoothly working staff—a factor lacking with their opponents—but in the rank and file, the Englishman outclassed the Prussian. Nevertheless, the professional soldier went down to defeat before the trained citizen in superior numbers. From this circumstance we draw the lesson that the day of the mercenary soldier is over. Under the policy of the nation, in arms, which has been forced on the world by Germany and her allies, it is impossible for any country to pay enough professional soldiers to take the entire responsibility for the protection of the nation. Such an arrangement would also be highly detrimental to moral standards.

In England, as would be the case in the United States, the regular army was but a stop-gap. When the real test of battle came, the nation had to fall back on the citizens to furnish fighting material. Additional forces were supplied under two heads, territorials, who are militia in its strictest sense, and volunteers.

It would be a tedious technical discussion to go into the reasons why the army formed from this material failed of its object. What is of importance is the fact that the English people—the most reluctant in the world to break with tradition—realized the necessity of compulsory service.

Had the measure of conscription been put into effect at the very outbreak of war, who can say how many useful lives might have been saved? Who can reckon how the conflict might have been shortened?

Unlike England, the United States has no “Grand Fleet” equal to the task of guarding its coasts. Should an invader disembark in the numbers that sifted through Belgium in 1914, the American regular army could be counted upon to make as heroic a stand as the First Hundred Thousand, but it would, in the end, be swept away.

Until the opening of hostilities the organization of the British army was divided into the regular army and a territorial army. A large part of the regular army was stationed in British dominions oversea. The territorial army serves at home in peace time, but in event of war, becomes an auxiliary reserve. Recruits for all forces are obtained by voluntary enlistment.

In time of peace the regular army embraces the standing army, the army reserve and a special reserve. In the standing army and army reserve the period of enlistment is for twelve years, with the permission to extend to twenty-one years under certain circumstances. Of the original twelve years, from three to nine are spent with the colors—that is on active service—the remainder of the enlistment is passed in the army reserve. As a rule, the majority of men serve seven years in the permanent force and five years in the reserve. Thus the English recruit for the regular army chooses soldiering as his lifework. Men enlist between eighteen and twenty-five years of age.

In peace time the establishment is never kept up to full strength and, upon the outbreak of the European war, difficulty was experienced in bringing the units up to the requirements, from the army and the special reserve forces.

Including all ranks, the peace total of the regular army is about 250,000. Roughly, these are divided as follows: 135,000 for service in the British Isles, 45,000 stationed in Egypt and the Colonies, with 75,000 English troops in India. The native army in India, at peace strength, numbers 159,000. The war strength of the English army, on paper, exclusive of all auxiliary and territorial forces, is 391,000. The territorial army in 1914 was 312,000. In the army estimates of 1914-15, before the outbreak of war, the total of the English home and colonial military establishments was reckoned at the high figure of 727,000. And this did not include the regular troops in India (75,000).

After the standing army (regular troops) England relies first on the special reserve, which might be classified under the convenient German term, Landwehr.

The special reserve consists in the main of troops not permanently embodied in the standing army, but its units act as regular depot battalions. Special reservists enlist for six years. The recruits, with certain exceptions, are put through five months’ preliminary training. The trained men of this force are called out annually for three weeks, with an additional six days’ musketry practice for infantry.

Officers are for the most part non-professional, and although the enlisted force includes some ex-regular army men, the special reserve still retains the flavor of militiaism, out of which it was created in 1907. In 1914 it was 80,000 strong. These numbers have been largely augmented and the reserve has been used to supply drafts both of officers and men for the regular army serving in the field.

The home defense force of the British Empire is the territorial army. This corresponds in purpose to the German Landsturm, although in composition it is entirely different. While an engagement in this body only involves duty in the British Isles, over 20,000 officers and men accepted liability for service abroad. The term of enlistment is for four years. Recruits must be from seventeen to thirty-five years old.

The training of the territorials consists in two weeks in camp annually, a certain number of prescribed drills varying with the branch, and a course in rifle shooting. Unless the soldier spends at least eight days in camp and passes an efficiency test, he is fined $25. All officers in the territorial army are non-professional, except certain generals and the staff.

While the establishment of the territorial army, on paper, in 1914 was 312,000 officers and men, the actual strength did not exceed 250,000. At once the original establishment was doubled. Although, as stated, the force was destined for home defense alone, as the war progressed, an overwhelming preponderance of the territorial army volunteered for foreign service. Immediately a number of battalions were sent to India to replace regular forces. During the first year of the war they continued relieving troops stationed in the various British possessions. Lately territorials have been sent directly to the theater of operations.

According to the budget, previous to the war, the cost of the English army in 1914-15 was $143,321,000.

It is very informing to review these figures, in the light of subsequent events. They show most forcibly how, during long periods of peace, the establishments of the military forces are allowed to shrink. The special reserve and the territorial army consisted of mere skeleton battalions, in no way fit to take the field. So, when the test came, the country had to rely alone on the regular army. Soon it was discovered that the volunteer system of recruiting—in time of peace—had not kept the units up to full quota. The plan of the English general staff decreed that on mobilization for war, the bulk of the regular army stationed in England would be organized into an “expeditionary force” consisting of a cavalry division, six infantry divisions with certain train and communication troops, making in all an aggregate of 165,000 officers and men. Service regulations put the infantry divisions at about 18,000 strong, with the cavalry division numbering under 10,000.

Yet when the British Isles were raked and scraped for soldiers, in August, 1914, the aggregate available for service was between 60,000 and 80,000, the estimated strength of the first British army sent to Flanders. Possibly a support of 20,000 followed the first contingents.

So, of the regular army, when the note of war sounded, not half were present for duty. But before we criticize the English military authorities, let us ask ourselves how many of the units of the American army would be available in emergency, and how near their paper strength would these units be? It is safe to assume that the United States would find itself in a much more serious predicament than Britain did under similar conditions.

While the “expeditionary force” was as fine a body of fighting men as the world will see, they, as I have indicated, could not hope to accomplish the task set before them. And it was found—as will always be the case where a military establishment must depend upon the grace of a legislative body for its maintenance—that the standing army was far below the required standard of enlistment.

Under war conditions the territorial army organizations broke down. What might have been the consequences if England were compelled to rely upon this force in case of invasion, is appalling to contemplate. Luckily, it was possible to reorganize the whole of the territorial establishment and—though for a long time many units were without rifles and equipment—it was possible to mobilize and stiffen them through preliminary training. As for taking the field, few, if any, of the battalions were fit for active service when war broke.

It is only fair to state that prevailing conditions were not wholly the fault of territorial officers and soldiers. The substitute for a citizen army was a good deal scoffed at in former times in England, and Punch leveled many of its jokes at the ignorance of the territorials. In time of stress the British press and public were glad to turn to these despised “toy soldiers” for aid.

The lessons from the experience of our mother country are obvious.

First, it is seen a country that relies on a limited—although highly trained—professional army cannot cope in combat with a state that follows the “nation in arms” principle.

The English army served an excellent purpose. Without it a large part of the British Empire would have had to depend upon local forces for protection. In brief, the function of the regular army in Great Britain, as in the United States, was primarily to garrison distant possessions. It was a sort of sublimated police. To expect such a force to meet any other hostile menace, successfully, is outside military reason. Mobilization is the first activity of defense, and it is obviously impossible to concentrate quickly, troops scattered over a large area of the earth’s surface.

Second, reserves cannot be improvised.

With the best will and spirit in the world, the English people could not throw into the field a proper supporting force for the first line. It was clearly demonstrated that the training of supplementary forces cannot be left to the moment of the outbreak of hostilities without entailing heavy and unnecessary losses in the first line. That the organization of new forces under the stress of war is always a difficult and demoralizing process was sharply shown. In this connection it was discovered that a haphazard system of second-line training in time of peace gave the minimum of efficiency in time of war.

Third, universal liability to service, certainly in event of war, is the only just and efficient system of defense organization.

Only after the bitterest lessons did England and the English people consent to conscription. It cannot be said the nation embraced the change in its military ideals, save in a spirit of resentment against Germany for making the measure necessary. But the government and the people realized it was no longer an abstract discussion between the principles of volunteering and conscription. Opposed as the body of the populace were to any measure in the smallest degree tainted with Prussianism, yet under the soul-testing ordeal of battle they took their lesson from the enemy and prepared to meet him on nearly equal terms.

How much of the material resources of England and how many of the lives of her gallant sons were lost because these pregnant lessons were not learned in time of peace, will never be computed. Today Great Britain is laboring heart and soul to remedy the military sins of the past. With characteristic doggedness Britannia is welding into being an army worthy of the nation. But present activity will not bring back the dead from the fields of Flanders. As we sow, so must we reap. It were well if the United States took the experience of England to heart and pondered deeply thereon.

CHAPTER VI
The New Era in Warfare

The science of war is never stationary. While in times of peace the evolution of armament and tactics, as a rule, are gradual and slow, during active operations, revolutionary changes may take place over night. Of such the first to come to mind was the encounter between the Merrimac and Monitor. These little ships, in their memorable battle, were the forerunners of the superdreadnaught. From such small beginnings nearly all radical military alterations arrive.

Therefore, in any study of preparedness we must watch closely successive military operations. The present European war will bring about a revolution in military science. The change may be more complete than that which marked the Napoleonic period, more radical than the era that saw the introduction of gunpowder. As the battle of Harfleur marked the change of military tactics in the fifteenth century, so will the battle of the Marne record the alteration of tactics in the twentieth century. During this battle, aeroplanes were first extensively used in “spotting,” which is a colloquial artillery term meaning to locate and indicate the range of enemy batteries.

The aged-proved axioms of strategy will always remain the same, yet the European war has evolved an extraordinary evolution in armament.

Already we see the first stages of war in the air in the sustained maneuvering of squads of Zeppelins. It would be safe to predict that soon battles as decisive as any waged on land or sea will be fought out in the sky. The air raids and the isolated combats that are matters of daily occurrence along the Franco-German fighting front will eventually develop into carefully planned operations by huge fleets of air craft, seeking to achieve a definite military objective. That these flying squadrons will meet other aerial armadas determined to defeat them, is obvious.

Before taking up the study of the possibilities of war in the air, it is essential that we examine the extraordinary military situation on the face of the earth. The year 1915 has seen nearly all Europe a vast testing ground of war’s basic elements. All the newest devices contrived by man for the killing of his fellowman have been tried out. The result is a vicious circle in the science of war. The new methods of defense are about equal to the new inventions for destruction. So that, finally, war still hinges on the hand-to-hand encounters.

The experts who theorized about the effect of modern weapons before the war, declared that battles would be conducted with immense intervals separating the contending forces. The killing power of the modern rifle was so great that troops could not approach within a mile of one another. But experience refutes theories. The trench lines of armies are now sometimes only ten yards apart.

Against the magazine rifle and the machine gun, the charge was impossible, the bayonet obsolete, said the wise ones. Far from being the fact, the charge is a nightly maneuver and the bayonet, especially the hand variety, is still the best weapon the soldier carries.

The military situation in Europe, in its present anomalous stage, is a heavy indictment of man’s vaunted development; he finds himself in the science of war, to which he has applied his best skill and brain power, little farther advanced after centuries of effort than the cave man. But the situation cannot remain as it is. There are factors behind the fighting lines that absolutely forbid the indefinite continuation of the existing state of war.

Strategy is the method employed to bring an enemy to battle. Its end is to wipe the enemy out of existence. In principle, this purpose of combat is eternal. Tactics, that is, troop handling, on the contrary, is no more stable than the weather.

A century ago Napoleon told us “tactics change every ten years.” Most of our modern generals seem to have overlooked this dictum. Within the last year the wisdom of the master tactician has been attested anew. Old tactical theories lie buried in the modern trench. Today we enter the period of subway warfare. The trench nullifies the most carefully thought-out plan of attack. It has made the maneuver battle a matter of history.

Fighting of real armies has come to the stage realized a decade ago in football—mass formation. But as mass formation produced a disproportion of disabled players, so the present offensives produce a war wastage out of all relation to results. The problem before the present commanders is to cut down that wastage and win.

That swift and decisive operations in France and Flanders by any belligerent are indefinitely postponed, was three times conclusively demonstrated by three separate attacks—the French in Champagne, the English at Loos, and the Germans at Verdun.

These attacks proved that, under the conditions which now hold, it is impossible to penetrate well-defended trench lines with sufficient numbers of victors to achieve a position of dominant strategic advantage. True, the offensives resulted in the capture of men, guns and positions, but the profit thereof was not worth the wastage.

The battle line in the west is rigid. In this hypothesis military problems are analyzed solely on the conditions in France and Flanders. Having cast the battle maneuver into the limbo of oblivion, what plan shall we substitute?

Forces along limited fronts can capture sections of the first, second and even the third line trenches, but there they must stop. No attack can maintain its propulsive power beyond the third line. The losses are too large; the winners who survive too few to hold. This first formula of modern warfare has been proved past all dispute.

Trench construction is now elaborated beyond all previous conception. Troops live like moles. Belgium and France are gridironed with tunnels, saps and ditches. In some districts the third line trenches are dug five miles in rear of the first. The intervening acreage is a forest of abatis. High and low wire entanglements spring like hop vines from the hill slopes. Deadly pitfalls with long impaling stakes planted at the bottom await the enemy. So when the stanchest regiments reach the third lines there remains but a group of shattered squads. Cohesion and direction are lost.

Supporting artillery fire is ineffective. The sources of ammunition dry up like a trickling stream in the desert. The assault dies. When new men and new ammunition are again gathered, the battle chiefs plan another offensive. The commanders are obsessed by the vision of that maneuver myth, “the Gap.” They reason, the enemy’s lines once pierced, all precedents demand that he retire. Unfortunately, past performances have no bearing on present warfare.

When Marshal von Mackensen inaugurated his idea of artillery in column-firing formation and cut the Russian front in Galicia, many military students thought this the beginning of startling new maneuvers. But when conditions were analyzed it was found that von Mackensen’s success was in large measure due to Russian ammunition failure.

The French curtain of fire is a variation of the German expedient. The defect in this use of artillery is the enormous expenditure. Shells are sown into the soil like seeds in a wheat field.

As Napoleon solved the tactical problems of other days, so I expect the trench dead-lock to be broken by a Frenchman. The French are the most ingenious of the contending nations. Unfortunately, they have not had complete command of all the forces in the field. This prevents them from attempting the extended “push and grip” action. Such action would be an assault along the total occupied frontage, from Nieuport to Belfort, 450 miles, with the object of gripping sections of the enemy’s position wherever weakness develops. It must always be preceded by the longest possible artillery fire.

Perhaps the near future will witness a maneuver which the tacticians have deemed impossible, a battle won with great guns alone. Man wastage is the woe of this war. The grim specter of the end of the human supply haunts every commander. It takes eighteen years to make a man, and hardly more than eighteen minutes to turn a shell. What the ratio of killing power may be has not been determined.

In the future we shall see artillery actions maintained continuously, not only 72 hours, but 144, even 200 hours. These bombardments will be one continual drum-roll of death. Can men, even when they are not hit, live under this deluge of shells? Some, perhaps, but the majority will be driven mad by the noise. The attacked area will be one great crater of smouldering débris. What with the man-made meteorites that disembowel great sections of the earth, dropping with the density of hail, the spread of poisonous vapors, the shrieks of the dying at night and all the incident horrors of bombardment, such a battlefield will be hell in miniature.

Add to this a vast subterranean attack, such as 50 or even 100 mines exploded simultaneously, and we reach the limit of ground and underground fighting.

What develops in aerial warfare is of vital interest to the United States. Like England, we have been asleep while our neighbors labored to produce a mechanical contrivance the world influence of which is beyond the flights of wildest fancy. The dirigible is the ship of the future. Out of the experience of this war it will come to be the great commercial carrier of the ages.

Look at the Zeppelin without prejudice excited by its early failures, and you will see a war vessel of infinite possibilities. Today it is in its infancy. Ten years from today the Zeppelin will be more mighty in radius and armament than the Nevada.

When in Berlin during the first period of the war I met a German officer who spoke often of an aerial invasion of England. At the time the plan seemed absurd. Since then I have seen the first Zeppelin come to London. The ghostly cylinder swam over the city while the searchlights centered their silver rays upon it. It looked to be as long as a surface car. My ear caught the faint purr of distant machinery. This sound was soon drowned in the muffled roar of bursting bombs.

Suddenly athwart the night sky a flashing meteor circled and burst with a sharp crack. Others came quickly in the wake of the first, showing the frantic haste of the men firing the anti-aircraft guns. The shrapnel spattered the sky with great globules of gold. Suddenly and mysteriously the monstrous silver cylinder shot up into the heavens, to be seen no more.

Then out of the west, burning buildings sent a red flare up into the night. Against this crimson haze the dome and cross of St. Paul’s was sharply silhouetted. Such was the first battle in the air. Dull indeed must be the imagination that was not stirred by the sight. Since then there can be no doubt that the airship will be a vital factor in future wars.

At present no other nation save Germany has a dirigible fleet worthy of the name. I heed the oft-repeated statement that the Zeppelin has not proved itself an auxiliary to the fighting forces. Perhaps as yet it can claim no startling success. But to assume no effective work from this “fourth arm” in the near future would be the height of military folly.

England commands the seas, and Germany commands the air. Out of this condition will come a contest that will shatter old military methods and maxims. The world will see the most astounding raid ever attempted. All these isolated attacks on the English coast—experimental practice trips—clearly foretell one end—an air invasion of England.

The experts in aeronautics agree such invasion is feasible. Combining all the aircraft available in the British Isles, including the Greek letter classes of airships, such a fleet would be no match for the flying craft Germany could put in the skies. Yet England boasts an aggregate of 15,000 aeroplanes.

Let me quote from F. C. Lancaster, the expert English aerial engineer:

“When, however, the weather conditions are favorable to attack, also in the case of attack by night, there is no means of defense at present known to the author which would prevent the enemy from inflicting enormous damage if he attack in sufficient numerical force and be prepared to attack with determination in spite of any losses he may sustain; no reasonable superiority in the defending aircraft, either individually or numerically, can be entirely effective.

“Neither can we pin our faith to counter aircraft artillery; under the conditions in question it may prove useless.... The raids which have been hitherto carried out are quite trivial and ineffective affairs compared with what in due course will become possible.”

These words are prophetic. In actual maneuvers, prepare to see flights by 100, 200—yes, 500 aeroplanes. These will be craft of all sizes and construction. The giant triplane is a fact. But aeroplane improvement will not stop there. The Skyorsky aeroplane, a mighty Russian machine that has carried sixteen passengers, points to future progress. The quadriplane, with a crew and armament equal in effect to an undersea boat, and capable of a 1000-mile flight at a speed rate of 100 miles an hour, is no mere figment of fancy.

The only check on air war is the dearth of trained fliers. When they are recruited in sufficient numbers on both sides, look for revolutionizing changes in the methods of conducting war.

No maneuvering army will be complete without an auxiliary air fleet. It is possible the air fleet will be the attacking force, and the earth-anchored infantry and guns act only as a supporting factor. No man can yet foresee how the “fourth arm” will be employed in grand tactics.

It needs no prophetic vision to foresee the development of the submarine. From the first, naval constructors have been working toward an undersea craft of greater radius and greater displacement. No mechanical problem forbids the 5000-ton submarine with a 6000-mile radius; such ships will probably take the waters this year.

A new type of periscope is being evolved which may vastly improve the undersea boats. But these rovers will find their raids more severely blocked than ever.

The “antisubmersible” is a new type of ship on the English roster. It is an elaboration of the swift launches used to combat the undersea ships in the English Channel and the Mediterranean. On these craft a special cast of gun will be mounted capable of throwing a subsea shell. Such at least is the claim.

The Merrimac and the Monitor changed the navies of the world over night. A new submarine invention might achieve the same results. With the discovery of the subsea light ray, this would happen. Only find some method of making clear the course of the submarine while it cruises beneath the waves, and you increase its service a thousand fold. Unseen and unsuspected, it might prowl the waters of the seven seas, scuttling ships of all enemies unmolested.

At present one submarine cannot fight another, because one submarine cannot see another. To send a submarine out to find and destroy a submarine would be like sending a blind man out in a city to find another blind man.

Give the submarine but one eye, and the mightiest superdreadnaught goes to the scrap heap. The naval change of 1863 may be paralleled in 1916.

Americans are first in the fields of mechanics, so this chapter is inserted with the intention of turning the minds of some of our inventors into channels that may serve in war. We have given the world both the submarine and the aeroplane. Let it be hoped we have not delivered a weapon into the hands of our enemy while we remain unarmed.

CHAPTER VII
The Strategic Position of the United States

“The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds.”—George Washington.

It is the fashion to say that the world is growing smaller. This figure of speech is deep with significance for the United States. No people know the fact of world shrinkage so well as our own, because of the characteristic passion of Americans for foreign travel. As a corollary, there is one subject that will always hold the interest of the United States citizen, whether the subject be looked at in the light of pleasure or profit, and that is transportation.

Step by step, the American republic has advanced in prosperity and prominence in stride with the progress of freight and passenger carriage. Present wealth in the United States is built upon the railroads. At the same time, the American people envy other nations their great sea tonnage.

While the citizens of the United States have studied the transportation problem extensively from the business point of view, few have examined its bearing upon the strategic position of the country. At the present stage of world development, no subject is more worthy of hard thought than the probable contraction of globe-encircling lines of communication.

It is a curious circumstance that the paths of war follow the paths of commerce. Still, if we go into the reasons for this phenomenon, they are seen to be consistently logical. The conflicts of commerce are often the precursors of warfare, so it is but natural the two conditions run along the same channels.

Thus, every point where the lines of transportation impinge upon the coast of the United States holds a danger—intimate or remote—to this country. In other words, the United States is open to attack at every point on the coast, except where local defenses protect individual cities. The coast of the United States includes not only the seaboard line of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with the Gulf of Mexico, but the shores of Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines and our Achilles heel, the Panama Canal Zone. The most remote possessions must be carefully considered in all plans of defense.

While more frequent and more rapid transportation will tend to bring outlying American dependencies into closer relations with the mother country, yet by their positions they will always be under the menace of potential enemies. Such menace increases in direct ratio to the lack of transports and shipping units in the United States.

In the exposition that follows bear constantly in mind the fact that the figures given for the time required to transport troops from point to point, is the maximum. Remember that each year shows an improvement in tonnage and speed in ocean-going ships. As a gauge of such advancement, compare the speed and displacement of the Mauretania with any ship considered an ocean leviathan twenty years ago. The comparison will give you an insight into the rate of world shrinkage.

The safeguard of isolation no longer exists. The oceans, instead of being barriers to possible enemies, are now convenient carriers of striking power. The number, speed and carrying capacity of ocean-going vessels make the sea lanes of peace easy avenues of attack in time of hostilities. The most conclusive demonstration of this fact was the British Expedition to the Dardanelles. Incident to this campaign, it was shown that sea transport was the safest and most convenient method of moving troops and material between distant points.

And as a supplement to ocean transport we must consider the aeroplane, the submarine and wireless telegraphy, with the increased radii of action of these elements and the possibilities of their further development. From my own experience, I expect to see improved Zeppelins sailing between Europe and the United States within ten years. If you want to arrive at a parallel which gives a hint of future aerial advancement, compare the “Claremont” of Fulton’s voyage down the Hudson in 1807 with the superdreadnaught “Pennsylvania.” The first successful steam vessel would not be fit for dingy work on the battleship. The improvement that has taken place within the last one hundred years in ocean-going transportation puts a very different complexion upon the American political status from that which inspired the actions of the fathers of the nation.

As the years pass, both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States will become more and more within the sphere of hostile activities of over-seas nations. So in planning for national defense let us not build only for today.

All American citizens know enough of the geographical circle of American influence to realize the many points of weakness it presents. On one side we offer the whole Atlantic seaboard, the coast line of the Gulf of Mexico, and the Colon entrance to the Panama Canal. Also Puerto Rico and the islands of the Caribbean Sea may be regarded as in the sphere of hostile activities, and readily assailable.

Because of the Monroe Doctrine, it can be accurately stated that the United States is liable to attack at any part of the Atlantic side of the Western Hemisphere, from Portland, Maine, to Punta Arenas, Patagonia.

The Pacific sphere of American influence is the open door to all enemies. It is conceded by military students that the island possessions of the United States could not be defended in case of attack, under the present army program. It is not necessary to enlarge upon this situation. What more nearly concerns the integrity of the Union is the undefended condition of Alaska. Finally, the entire western area of the country is exposed to aggression.

Here also the entrance to the Panama Canal is a strategic objective sure to receive prompt attention from any enemy. Again, on the Pacific side of the American continent, the prohibition of the Monroe Doctrine can be challenged. One sword-prick and this paper rampart will be breached. In order to get the strategic outline of the United States in your mind, try to imagine all possessions girdled by a fortress wall. Remember, we have no troops to man more than an infinitesimal section of this imaginary bulwark, and guns are placed only at rare and immense intervals along it. That it lacks the first essential of a fortress, positions of mutual support, is immediately observed. Again it is at once evident that the lines of communication, another basic element of defense, are from every angle, outside immediate boundaries, assailable. The measure of defense to be expected at points of probable assault can be approximately estimated by the number of troops present at the points. It is assumed the forces have the requisite amount of ammunition and artillery to meet initial operations of an enemy. Figures obtained from the War Department give the usual peace time distribution of the fighting forces of the army as follows:

In the United States (including Coast Artillery) | 51,000

In the Philippines:

Regular troops | 13,500
Native scouts | 6,000

In Puerto Rico

700

In Alaska

800

In Hawaii

9,600

In Panama

6,200

| 87,800

From this table it is possible to estimate what effectives can be placed in the field at the immediate outbreak of hostilities. No allowance is made for “war strength,” which, under the system prevailing in the United States army, is largely a myth. To add a thousand untrained men to an infantry unit does not double the fighting ability of that unit, although it doubles its numerical strength. Such a proceeding is more likely to demoralize a dependable force. The worst feature of the whole American plan is the war-expansion idea. Stop a moment to analyze what the scheme means.

In peace, regiments are homogeneous aggregations of disciplined, equipped and trained soldiers. They are fighting teams. Think what will happen when the team is suddenly doubled in size, by adding undisciplined and unarmed, untrained elements. Admitting that it were possible to absorb these troops into the original regiment (a result in itself impossible, because the rifles for the supplementary troops are not made), how would the fighting value of the force be affected? Any army officer, and there are many who have approximated the experience outlined during the Spanish-American war, will tell you that the original efficiency of the unit suffers a distinct loss. The theory that it is possible to strengthen armies with undigested recruits added to veteran forces is a fallacy often proved on the battlefield.

As our subject is preparedness against war, defenses must be considered in the light of deterrents from attack. Let us see what forces could be mobilized to meet a foe on the East.

Officers of the General Staff have agreed that, in case of war with a first-class power on the Atlantic, the portion of the country lying between and including Maine and Virginia would undoubtedly be the primary objective of an invader. While all other points along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and all points on our land frontiers would undoubtedly be in danger, the danger would be secondary to that of the Atlantic states named. Roughly, any one of the first-class powers could transport 150,000 to 350,000 soldiers to American shores within fifteen days. This result is worked out from what is known of the troops available and the serviceable transport at the disposition of the great European powers and the time needed to load the assumed expeditionary army and cross the ocean. The factor of naval interference is not considered.

It must be taken for granted that the enemy would not be able to gain a foothold in any of the coastal fortified areas by direct naval attack, and in consequence, would be forced to choose some suitable place on the Atlantic seaboard from which land operations could be conducted against both the important coast cities and the rich commercial centers in the interior. Between the fortified positions on the coast, long stretches lie open to the enemy. The only cure for this weakness is a mobile land force sufficient to deter a potential aggressor from making the attempt at landing.

There is a simple test to determine how rapidly units can be moved and how many troops can be concentrated at some designated point on the periphery of the United States. Such a maneuver—which would be a splendid object lesson—could be planned to follow closely probable political and military sequences.

The War Department would assume that diplomatic relations with a certain first-class European power were at the breaking point.

A confidential order is then issued to the Chief of Staff. It is supposed, in stating the problem, that cabinet conferences and congressional agitation have no material bearing on the course of events. Hardly has the head of the army received his admonitory order, when a special agent in the certain hostile European power reports mobilization activities in the vicinity of a named port. This information, confirmed from other sources, is assumed to come to hand on June 1st. However, diplomatic negotiations continue, so the American government, ever hopeful of avoiding war, does not act upon the information received until the 4th of June. On this day the American ambassador in the certain first-class European power is handed his passports. War against the United States is declared at midnight.

Before the last echoes of the striking hour have died away over the waters of the named port, a fleet of fifty transports carrying the first hostile expedition puts to sea. The enemy fleet is already in position on the Atlantic.

In our maneuver, news of the sailing of the transports is supposed to arrive in Washington the morning of June 5th. Immediately the War Department issues the necessary orders for mobilizing the regular army. National Guard and militia forces are also called upon. At this time it is unknown at which point the enemy may choose to attempt a landing. Therefore the available forces can only be moved to positions in rear of salient points.

It is assumed the American and enemy fleet meet, and, owing to superior organization on the part of the invader, the American ships are sunk or scattered. The naval battle takes place June 12th. Now the hostile transports are half way across the Atlantic Ocean. News of the naval defeat reaches the United States on June 13th. From the course and position of the transports, as reported by an American destroyer, the enemy is seen to be moving to strike at either New York or Washington. Orders from the War Department and the General Staff follow fast. On June 18th the enemy squadron is sighted steaming directly towards New York. On the night of June 20th (the time calculated for the sea-crossing having elapsed) the enemy is supposed to begin disembarking at Fort Pond, Long Island. Here our experiment ends.

To furnish the answer to the question of preparedness all that is now necessary to reckon is the aggregate number of American troops, regulars, National Guard and militia, in position to oppose the assumed landing. Granting that the enemy has 150,000 troops on the transports—a moderate estimate in view of the forces available in the first-class powers of Europe—how many American soldiers will be fighting the invader and what are our chances of driving him back to his ships?

Could the War Department be allowed the money necessary for carrying out the experiment outlined above, the result would be a stunning object lesson for the citizens of the United States.

Without putting the maneuver into actual practice, we can deduce certain facts. From the table furnished by the War Department we know that there are in the United States (when not diverted to follow a Mexican bandit) a few over 50,000 regular troops. In our problem, however, we must subtract 15,000 coast defense soldiers from this total, as these are not mobile. So we are left with 35,000 soldiers to defend 3,000,616 square miles of territory and 20,000 miles of continental coast. We know that these troops are scattered over the United States from Maine to California, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. The time necessary to transport them from their posts to the Atlantic seaboard can be approximately computated. But what cannot be ascertained is the help the railroads will be able to give in meeting an unexampled situation. How long it will take to mobilize the rolling stock necessary for the movement of the troops is a time factor we must allow for with a large margin.

The records of the past performances of the army in time of war are available, and they contain nothing calculated to inspire the hope that more than half the total forces posted in the United States could be mobilized on the Atlantic coast within fifteen days. Allowing a little grace, the greatest number of regular troops that could be thrown against the landing invader is 20,000. It needs no extraordinary military knowledge to estimate how long such a force could stand against 150,000. The regulars will be supplemented by a large force of militia, as the attack is supposed to take place in New York, where the National Guard organization is strongest. But anyone in the smallest degree familiar with the limitations of the citizen regiments, as at present organized, equipped and trained, knows that they will only be available as a supporting line of doubtful value. To throw the state troops into action against the soldiers of any first-class European power, under the conditions that now hold, would be murder.

Ammunition, the vital necessity of fighting units, is not considered, but from the lessons learned in Europe it is known that the rate of expenditure far surpasses the measure of supply. It would be interesting to discover how much and what class of ammunition could be supplied the artillery of the United States defensive force. Calculated according to the expenditure of artillery ammunition during daily battles along the Buzra River in Russia, the American army could rely for support from its batteries for half a day.

Transferring the scene of activities to the Pacific coast, the same general conditions will prevail. Only, from the peculiar geographical outline of the country and the difficulty of transportation, this part of the United States is far weaker, strategically, than the eastern seaboard. This is the fact, in spite of the distance separating the Pacific coast from the ports of a possible enemy. To load 150,000 troops and cross the Pacific Ocean would require not less than twenty-two days. But once a hostile force was landed on the west sector of the Union, the utmost difficulty would be experienced in dislodging it.

Washington State offers a particularly inviting objective to an enemy in the Puget Sound district. This corner of the United States is completely cut off from the rest of the country by great natural obstacles. At the same time, it presents a long stretch of coast open to attack. It would be no difficult matter for a first-class Pacific power to strike at Puget Sound, enter western Washington, seize and destroy the important bridges and tunnels linking the state with the rest of the country, and establish an army so securely that a great force and a long time would be necessary to dislodge it. The natural resources, as well as the industrial condition, of this region are calculated to maintain an invading army of 150,000 men for an indefinite period.

The situation in California is even more perilous. There are so many points along the extended coast of this state an enemy would be in a quandary as to the best for his purposes. While the transportation facilities are somewhat better than in Washington State, this advantage is offset by the enormous area of California. To mobilize enough troops to meet invasion at the many possible landing places would be a task beyond the power of an army numbering less than 250,000 men. The peril of California is increased because of its border adjoining Mexico. Nothing at present stops hostile forces from entering the state over the southern border. The little strip of Lower California offers an enemy a suitable position upon which to establish an advanced base of operations. Once admit a hostile army into this great western commonwealth, and all the resources of the nation, in men and money, would be needed to drive him out. His expulsion would only be accomplished after years of effort and the loss of thousands of lives. It follows that the military preparation of the West must be such as to forbid any potential enemy the thought of invasion.

Passing to the oversea possessions of the United States, it is discovered that each distant territory presents a special military problem. The forces that would garrison the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, Alaska, not to mention Guantanamo and Puerto Rico, in case of war, would perform a distinct tactical and strategic mission. Dependent upon long sea communication for aid from the home country, they would have to be in all ways self-supporting and able to maintain themselves for long periods of isolation. It is impossible to maintain a force strong enough to hold the entire island territory of the United States. All that can be hoped for is to keep some point that is a key position, while allowing the enemy to have his way over the undefended area. The Hawaiian Islands and Panama present a strategic problem that cannot be treated in this manner. The former would offer a convenient base for an enemy operating against the Pacific coast, and tend to nullify the advantages accruing from the possession of the Panama Canal. The question of their defense is largely technical and does not depend so much on the size of the force assigned as the organization of defenses and the co-operation of the navy.

The Panama Canal is the most important strategic position within the domain of the United States. The whole foundation of American military and naval strength is based upon the control of this highway connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific Oceans. It follows that no effort is too great to secure this point from capture. The complicated machinery of the locks, spillways and basins of the canal call for extraordinary precautions in safeguarding them, and demand an organization large enough and efficient enough to protect these easily destroyed mechanisms, under all circumstances. A resolute commander with a picked force could land at a point outside the range of the sea-coast guns and with skill find his way to some vulnerable sector of the canal and destroy its usefulness for an indefinite period. The most pressing problem confronting the American nation is to provide immediately for the safety of the canal.

The strategic problems of the United States are so many and so intricate that they lead us far into the domain of the technical soldier. But omitting the highly specialized quality of knowledge needed, when the last professional soldier has had his say, the problem of defense depends upon the number of troops available in time of attack.

The officers of the American general staff have compiled a plan of preparedness. In all probability, this plan would insure the United States against war. Surely the well-considered conclusions of our professional soldiers merit the respectful consideration of the non-military population. In passing, let me correct a wrong impression prevalent among people unacquainted with the army officers. American officers are not hungering for war. They know the consequences of conflict better than the civilian. To suggest that the leaders of the United States army desire war in order to exercise knowledge, is a scandalous indictment based upon ignorance or thoughtlessness. The majority of army officers are family men who work hard at their vocation, and have as much to lose through warfare as other citizens.

To return to the strategic problems, it is next to impossible to arouse all of the inhabitants of the United States to the serious consideration of the problem of preparedness against war. While the coast states are keenly interested in the discussion, citizens living in the interior scoff at talk of danger. All of which operates against the evolution of a sound military policy. Another factor militating in opposition to the plans of defense is the wrong conclusion drawn from the past experiences of the United States in war. Providence has been kind to the American republic. We have emerged from many conflicts successfully. But when the military student analyzes the reasons for our success, he is amazed. The fact that the United States exists today is due in the first instance to the timely aid of the French at a critical stage of the Revolutionary War, and to a wonderful sequence of events, classified only under the head of luck. Is it good policy to depend upon luck to save us in the future?

CHAPTER VIII
The Instinct of Defense

“If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our growing prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.”—George Washington.

The instinct for defense is as old as the world. It grew out of the habit of the strong to prey upon the weak. In the dawn of civilization, the cave man would shoulder his bludgeon and go forth to slay any brother whose stores or woman he coveted. Later, the bold and unthrifty raided the weak and saving. This state of affairs drove the less warlike together for defense and thus in due course evolved the nucleus of national life.

Families banded together and took the necessary measures for safeguarding mutual interests. Such was the basic element of military evolution. True, armies were debauched from their original ends by ambitious princes, but this does not alter the case that the function of a military force is to protect the homes and property of peoples. It is well, in the echo of the battle-guns of Europe, to recall these facts.

The defenseless invite attack. Witness the plight of Belgium. With my own eyes I have seen the penalty of unpreparedness paid in blood and ashes. Whole cities were laid waste because the citizens were incapable of defending them. I witnessed the flight of a nation before the tidal wave of invasion. Man for man and woman for woman these fugitives were the richest race in Europe. Resting on the false promises of neighbors, Belgium made no adequate preparation for defense. Its only sin was weakness. Because the men of Belgium had not been trained in the skill and taught the duty of defense, their motherland lies crushed. The old have died by the roadside, when panic drove thousands before the menace of war unchained. Children sickened and starved. What women suffered may not be written. Who in our country can give thought to these facts without the chill of fear creeping into his heart. Our men are the defenders of our women. The weak, the children of the country, are in their charge. Pass all abstract considerations and fix alone on the safety of the home, the protection of loved ones, and we find ourselves back to first principles. The social state can only be preserved by mutual support in time of attack. Thus the first duty of every citizen is to defend his country.

In that long era when nations depended upon hirelings to do their fighting, the significance of this duty was lost. Selfishness led to shirking the sacrifices demanded by war. Many wars were but the conflict of the policy of princes. Let it be hoped that conflicts willed by the people alone will bring nations to arms in future. But one eternal human law will forever urge man to settle his last battle through trial by blood. That law is the struggle for existence. War today is only the continuation of national policy.

While the American people have shown themselves averse to war, who demands that in order to avoid bloodshed we abandon the Monroe Doctrine or surrender our rights in the markets of the world? No man dare say war will never again visit America.

Study the table of the world’s greatest producing nations. Foremost among all others you will find the United States. Nature has given us enormous riches. The ingenuity of our people has developed and amplified national resources. In twenty years we will have forged so far ahead of the other nations of the earth that our position will be the envy of the world. With wealth will come weakness. Unless a radical change develops in the policy of this country looking towards greater national security, when we reach the zenith of our prosperity we will invite attack from every side.

No better parallel can be found showing the fate in store for the rich but unprepared nation than the extinction of ancient Peru. Before the advent of Columbus, a happy and prosperous people lived in the Andean valleys. Ruins of wonderful cities, once adorned with temples and palaces, testify to the wealth of the Empire of the Incas. Fabulous ornaments of gold and silver beautified these buildings. From the scanty records remaining, we know the ancient Peruvians enjoyed a highly developed social system. They excelled in the arts of peace. Relying on the towering crags that surrounded their valley-land, the Peruvians forswore and condemned all military effort, and devoted themselves assiduously to husbandry. Down the slopes of the valley of Cuzco winds an irrigation system challenging the best of modern times. Here is testimony enough of the prosperity of the subjects of the Incas.

The race lived long in peace, secure in the impregnability of the mountain ramparts. The fable of their riches and their cities spread. The population of the kingdom was estimated from 2,000,000 to 7,000,000. Those 2,000,000, let us say, were conquered by 184 Spanish “gun men.” The Peruvians saw their cities sacked, their women violated, their ruler murdered. The men, women and children were sold into slavery, where they toiled out a miserable existence, delving in mines that had been the source of their own wealth, to satisfy the avarice of the conquerors. Study the story of the conquest of Peru and learn the consequences of unpreparedness. You will find there a parallel for every incentive and every act of modern war. From the history of the Incan kingdom two obvious facts stand out. First, natural resources, wealth, is more a temptation to neighbors than a factor of strength. Second, no nation can avoid war and exist when another nation wishes to force war upon it.

There are those who point to the wonderful natural and artificial resources of the United States and deduce from these great strength. In war our wealth would simply be a spur to the enemy. To put the discussion in colloquial analogy, who would win in a fight between Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan and “Jack” Johnson?

Because we are a peace-loving people it does not follow we shall remain immune from attack. Let us labor for our ideals, but do not let our most ardent impulses for world betterment blind us to the basic facts of human nature. God has been good to the people of the United States. No other nation enjoys the fruits of the earth and of industry in so great a measure as we do. It is easy for us to advocate universal peace and the arbitration of all disputes, because we have everything to gain from peace and everything to lose by war. To put the matter bluntly, universal peace and unlimited arbitration implies we can shirk our manifest responsibilities.

We are confident in the forensic skill of our advocates. But is it possible for any rational being to reconcile the existence of The Hague Peace Palace, with its thousands of volumes of words on the abolition of war, and the settlement of all disputes according to the decisions of a few ideal personages with God-like attributes, with the furious whirlwind of battle sweeping Europe today? The print was hardly dry on the type recording the polished rhetoric of peace before the armies of the belligerents were marching to mutual slaughter. Peace is the vapor of words, war the substance of deeds. Differentiate the fact of war, and the strong probability of the continuation of war by such nations as find the method suiting their self-interests, from the abstract discussions of a millennium when all national contests will be settled by a set of incorruptible and infallible judges. While man remains finite in his wisdom and judgment, blood conflict will continue.

We may not wish war, but what shall we do if an aggressive adversary attacks us? Hostilities may develop from the flimsiest foundations. Our political attitude, our wealth, our geographic position invite attack. It is highly rational to consider aggression possible. What should we do if New York and Washington were captured? Surrender the occupied territory and live in sweet peace with our conquerors (who doubtless would rest content with the easily acquired provinces and cities), purchase an evacuation (which would assure immunity for the future, perhaps), or fight? Is there an American citizen worthy of the name who would hesitate in his choice?

I remember what I reverently think of as my first glimpse into the soul of soldiers fighting, as our fathers fought at Lexington and Brandywine. I had left the German lines in Belgium, passed the last patrol of Uhlans at Middlekerke, crossed the few kilometers separating the opposed forces, until at Westende I stopped my motor beside the foremost Belgian picket. He was a boy in his twenties. Fresh from the sight of the masterful mechanism of the German war organization, this sentry looked like a child in the path of the Juggernaut. After showing my papers I offered to carry him into his lines at Nieuport.

“The Germans are not more than five kilometers away, you know; they are coming.”

His eye flashed scorn at my suggestion.

“My place is here. Let them come.”

Outside Nieuport an outpost was dug in along the road. The blue barrel of a machine gun shining out of the trench-top looked like the rigid body of a snake stretched along the macadam. A bearded sergeant took my papers. While he studied them I found myself under the eyes of a war-worn group. What a story those eyes told! They held an unearthly light. It seemed as if they were looking beyond me and the sand dunes, the sea even, into another world. Trench-soiled, uncouth, bearded with the tangled growth of hard campaigning, the eyes of those soldiers seemed to shed a radiance about them. If the eye is the window of the soul, I saw into the spirit of these men. Enshrined there was an ideal—the sacrifice of self for country.

When the sergeant gravely returned my papers I raised my hand sharply to my hat rim, the group as a man returned my salute. I drove on with the old Roman words of death defiance uppermost in mind: Morituri salutamus.

Horrors, or atrocities, as they are designated in war, are almost always confined to the operations of invading armies. So it is a country such as the United States, where traditions and geographic position place us on the defensive, that must suffer most should an enemy strike. It is unthinkable that our nation will ever engage in an armed adventure of aggrandizement. Those who rant against adequate measures for protection insult the majority of the American people by crying out that making our citizens into competent defenders of their homes, property and families means sowing the seed of world conquest. If this were true, it were better we disarm and perish than continue to enjoy the liberty for which our forefathers suffered and died. We are not worthy of the liberty secured to us by the blood spilled from Bunker Hill to Yorktown, from Bull Run to Appomattox, if we are not to be trusted with the weapon necessary for our self-preservation.

The confusion of thought on the question of defense has arisen from our conception that the regular army is solely responsible for the safety of the nation. Vaguely our citizens, who are so occupied with other interests they cannot give the subject the thought it merits, understand that in event of a war of the dimensions of the struggle of 1861-65, the regular soldiers would be reinforced by volunteers. But the question of reserve, in fact, the whole problem of protection, is pushed out of mind because it is considered a remote contingency that this nation will again be faced with no alternative but war. In the end it is assumed that the seas protect us.

After what has passed in Europe during the last year and a half no man can honestly believe our regularly enlisted force, numbering not more than 90,000 combatants, scattered over our lands from Alaska to Florida, in Hawaii and the Philippines is competent to fend an attack resolutely directed against this country. Since the Civil War the United States army has been little more than a super-police force. The comparison of the standing army of this country with the forces of the powers that may move against us leads to absurd results. Should an enemy elect to land on Long Island and move on New York, as Lord Howe did in 1776, granting that it were possible to mobilize the whole regular army to meet the invasion, it would be brushed aside more easily than were the Continental forces of Washington. With the present supply of ammunition the American army could not make as stubborn a stand as did the Belgians at Liège.

The whole theory of the small regular army in this country is based on the assumption of the availability of every fit male for military service. This theory comes to us from colonial days. In former times, considering the conditions that obtained, it may have been justifiable. But today the practice of war has changed. Improvisation is no longer possible. We live in the era of the “nation in arms.” And the nations approaching the United States in population and material wealth drill and arm all suitable citizens. Granting the possibility of war, to continue in the present state of defenselessness is a stupid crime.

On the theory that our army cannot be trusted, and therefore must be kept down to lowest strength, is it not doubly incumbent on the citizens of the country to adopt some system of self-preparation? In case of emergency the flower of the nation would rush to the colors. Yes, without officers, without arms. The men who might attempt to bulwark our shores against invasion would, to borrow a current phrase, serve as cannon fodder.

The trouble with most of the well-intentioned citizens of this country who argue against defense-training is that they have never actually seen what happens when untrained and under-munitioned troops meet highly organized opponents. The result is massacre. The braver the untrained force, the more vicious the massacre. Men will continue to lay down their lives for their homes and liberties, but is it not the right of all to demand that the sacrifice be not in vain? Under the conditions of modern life, the average man cannot train and equip himself, and even if he could, this is far from being the sum total of preparation for defense. An army is one of the most complex and highly organized businesses of the times. Today the casual reader of the daily papers must be aware of this fact. Thus we are brought back to the problem of defense. As we are a self-governing people, so are we a self-defending people. It is right that we continue with a reasonably small standing army. But this implies the liability of every fit male citizen of military age to be trained and ready to supplement the work of our small army when the national life and liberties are endangered. The degree of training and readiness must insure the repelling of an enemy before material damage has been inflicted on the lives and property of the people.

It argues a limited insight into the qualities of Americans to think that they would not respond with their total mental and material resources if the land should be invaded. Such is not the contention. In plain words, when our citizen body of military age is instructed in tactics and when the nation has a sufficient supply of war material to arm and equip these citizen soldiers, we shall avoid death, suffering and the horrors of war, perhaps war itself. Should war come, the protection we can offer our women and children will be in the ratio of our preparation.

Nations, like men, have their part to play in the march of civilization. No nation can shirk this part and keep its own honor. The United States boasts the only purely altruistic act credited to a conquering sovereignty. It fought a war on sentiment, occupied territory, and when the war and the evils that follow war were remedied, withdrew wholly from that territory. The United States set a new standard. Having done this, it must maintain its place among the ranking powers of the world and bring the pressure of its influence for good on all international questions.

Today the American republic provides no adequate protection for the lives of its citizens or their property in case of war.

We have seen the fate of nations unprepared.

We are rich beyond all other countries. The total wealth of the United States is $187,000,000,000; greater than Germany and Great Britain combined.

Our greatest wealth is concentrated in cities on or near our coast line. With bitter shame we remember how easily our capital was once captured.

At this moment two-thirds of the world is ablaze with battle. What will be resolved from this stupendous conflict no one can prophesy. Is it not time for the people of the United States to put their house in order?

CHAPTER IX
What Shall We Do?

“A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined, to which end an uniform and well-digested plan is requisite.”—George Washington.

A plan put forward to solve the defense problem of the United States can be simple in outline, but must become complex in detail. Yet the skein of detail will be readily disentangled if the outlined plan rests upon sound principles. Any departure from proved and accepted postulates of military development will end in disaster.

Today, happily, the majority of the American people are alive to the pressure of preparedness against war. Moreover, they are not likely to be gulled by the inertia or the trickery of politicians. In the end the citizens will demand a system of national defense commensurate with the peril of the republic.

Heretofore, owing to the fact that the greater part of the uninformed public confuse valor with efficiency, it has been difficult to arouse sentiment in favor of increasing the United States military establishment. The old tradition that the farmer would drop his plowshare in the furrow, grasp his fowling piece, rush to the defense of his country and triumph, dies hard. If there still exists in this nation anyone who cherishes this delusion let him discard it forever. You cannot fight against machine guns with pitchforks.

Conditions prevailing in this republic since the presidency of Jefferson have colored the subsequent trend of military development. The people, for some inexplicable reason, have never trusted the regular army. During the Jeffersonian régime the army was reduced almost to the vanishing point—about 3,000 aggregate. Senators and Congressmen gloried in the fact that thus the Treasury of the United States was saved the sum of $522,000 annually, and proclaimed from the capitol the boast that in practically eliminating its armed force this young republic had set a standard for the world, and, because no army existed, all cause for war ceased. Eight years later the Senate and the members of the House of Representatives made an exceedingly hasty and undignified exit before the invader. A concourse of ribald enemy-soldiery seated in the very halls where the solemn lawmakers propounded their sophisms was the answer to the policy of army suppression. Will history repeat itself?

Every plan of national defense must proceed from a discussion of the size of the navy. The peculiar geographical position of the United States makes the naval program of the nation a matter of supreme importance. Wisely Congress has brought into being a body of officers technically trained, and turned over to them the duty of examining the American naval situation in all aspects and furnishing Congress with the result of these investigations, with their recommendations. Unwisely the national legislators have never fully accepted the recommendations of the Naval Board. Battleships bring no votes. In consequence, United States naval strength is entirely unequal to the task of defending the country against an enemy of the first class. Our naval needs can be stated in two sentences. On the Atlantic coast the United States must at all times possess a fleet superior in speed and guns to that which the German nation keeps afloat. On the Pacific seaboard American ships must be greater in number and more efficient than those of Japan. Until this standard is reached, the Panama Canal notwithstanding, United States shores are open to invasion.

Throughout this book it has been the intention to confine the discussion to measures for evolving sufficient land forces for national defense, so no further elaboration of the naval situation will be attempted. But for all those Americans who would inform themselves on the fate of ships in conflict, the author recommends a study of the sea encounters in the present war, and most earnestly suggests a thoughtful perusal of the story of the battle of the Straits of Japan. Herein is a lesson that the United States should take seriously to heart.

The regular army is the only force which could be thrown against an invader. It is the only force approximately ready for the defense of the nation. I say approximately, for the army is sadly deficient in artillery and ammunition.

It is to be regretted that the regular organization of the United States is a mercenary force.

To depend upon hireling troops to repel invasion makes the average citizen shirk the whole question of individual defensive duty. The taxpayer considers he has bought immunity from attack. Certain sums are appropriated each year out of the Treasury for the support of the army and navy. The ordinary citizen takes little interest in the history of these appropriations. That the American citizen is satisfied with the huge cuts made by wrong-headed Congressmen, in both naval and army estimates (carefully prepared by trained officers) is proved by the return of these Congressmen term after term to Washington.

Thus the average voter fails twice in his duty to his country. First, by tacitly denying that it is incumbent upon each citizen of the commonwealth to share in the task of national defense, and second, by indifference to measures which vitally affect national security.

However, so long as the people of the United States put their reliance upon the regular army to secure to them the uninterrupted enjoyment of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, let their first care be to see that the force is equal to the task. The highest authorities agree that an army approximately 250,000 strong would be sufficient for the work. It has been said that under the present opportunities for employment in the United States it would be difficult to recruit the army up to the figure quoted. Whether this is fact or opinion can be determined by test. These handicaps of recruitment would be greatly modified if the army increase contained a sufficiently high proportion of technical troops. In this mechanical age war is highly scientific. One of the great needs of our present organization is the expansion of the engineer corps, signal corps and aeronautical section. The American army is without railway or balloon units and no adequate train corps exists. If the scope of the organization were enlarged as it should be, undoubtedly the popularity of the technical branches, which appeal to the ambitions of the average young man, would attract a sufficient number of recruits gradually to bring the service up to required strength.

The enlargement of the field artillery, with the adoption of an additional heavier type of mobile cannon, in view of the lessons of the European war, is a matter that should receive immediate attention. The present artillery complement of the army is sadly inadequate for the usual duties assigned to this arm. It is under-armed and under-munitioned. The artillery, excepting coastal divisions, is the most neglected branch of the service, in view of its military importance. Yet in personnel, it is a true corps d’elite. No officers of the army surpass our “gunners” in professional knowledge and pride in their work.

The present issue of field-piece is an excellent type. It approaches in model the famous French field-gun. But, all told, there are only six regiments of mobile artillery. If in case of emergency it were possible to concentrate the whole of the force against an invader, under the accepted standard organization of foreign armies, our defending cannon would be outnumbered and outranged. With but six artillery regiments, comprising all the batteries in the army of the United States, it is difficult to decide if the situation is more absurd than sad.

In the evolution of warfare brought about by the present conflict it has been found that the heavier type of field-gun, 4.9, or a similar caliber, is absolutely necessary to meet battle conditions. No battery of field artillery in the United States contains such a gun. As for mobile howitzers of the Skoda type, eleven-inch pieces of enormous power and effect, that such guns will be provided is beyond the dreams of the most sanguine enthusiast for United States army improvement.

The above details are only dwelt upon in order to give the citizen a suggestion of the pressing wants of the army. Any scheme of organization should be left in entirety to the decision of the officers who devote their lives to the study of the subject. As has often been said, the United States government pays a number of specialists to draw up plans to meet the problem of defense, and Congress immediately scraps the whole material. Such a proceeding would wreck any ordinary business organization, and it is obvious that it will run this republic on the rocks of military disaster unless remedied. What the regular army needs is more men and more and heavier guns. Let the citizen stand on the broad platform of a correctly proportioned regular army of 250,000 men. Let him impress his views firmly upon his Congressman. Then, at least, the citizen will have fulfilled a large part of his duty to his country.

Before passing to a discussion of the required army reserve, let us consider two points which from personal experience seem to be of importance.

First, in all that I have seen in the different theaters of war, nothing has so much impressed me as the effectiveness of the machine gun. The value of this weapon in defense is well recognized by all belligerents. The English staff have gone to the length of organizing a separate machine-gun corps. As this is essentially a weapon of defense—which is the military problem of the United States—let us follow the lead of England in this matter and create sufficient machine-gun regiments to protect the thousand and one points on American shores where an enemy may be expected to land. The machine gun is cheap and effective. Besides, this measure can be put into operation in a comparatively short time.

My second suggestion is more radical. It deals with the promotion of officers from the ranks in the regular army. The army is the only “business” in the United States that does not offer encouraging chances of advancement from the bottom up. It is possible for an enlisted man to obtain a commission, but experience shows that this method of gaining shoulder straps is the exception rather than the rule. It may not be exact to say West Point is undemocratic in effect, but certainly it is undemocratic in principle. Let it be made a rule that all graduates serve a certain specified time in the ranks before being commissioned, and also make provision for helping the enlisted men to seek advancement in the service. Take innumerable examples of business success and in many instances it will be found that the head of the organization has risen from the humblest position. He knows his work from the closest contact with it and intimate experience. No one thinks of looking askance because the president of the Federal Iron and Steel Company began his career as office boy. Why should not the steps of promotion be as accessible to the private in the army as they are in civil life. Let the young men of the country be stimulated to enter the service, in order to gain commissions. In case of war, a large number of officers would have to be improvised (it is laughable to state that there are 16,000 efficient officers now available in the United States), and although doubling the capacity of West Point is a splendid remedy for officer shortage, it savors of political expediency. Give the self-respecting enlisted man the chance he is entitled to, make the regular army a career, and at once you bring the army closer to the people.

Under the conditions that prevail in the United States, a regular army is the only force that can be considered as first-line troops available for mobilization against invaders. As it is impossible, because of political and economic considerations, to maintain a standing army large enough and strong enough to meet potential foes and definitely defeat them, at all points of the periphery of the United States, and as all potential enemies have armies vastly superior to that of the United States, it is imperative that the regular forces be supplemented by a certain class of reserves.

Granting the building up of the standing army will be properly carried out, the question of national existence depends upon the correct solution of the problem of the American secondary army. The author is firmly of the opinion that universal service is the only democratic and logical solution of the problem. For some reason the average man in civil life confounds universal military training with “militarism.” From a study of the chapters dealing with the French, Australian and Swiss systems it is seen that the two ideas can be sharply differentiated. Militarism—or, to give it the correct designation, Prussianism—exists in Germany because it is fostered by an autocratic government. Conditions in France are absolutely the reverse. In Switzerland the army is a most popular institution. If the American people could divest themselves of the preconceived notion that military service is servile, and that the liberties guaranteed them under the Constitution were infringed by submitting to discipline, the problem of defense would solve itself.

The great fault of militarism is the creation of officer privilege. The officer caste is a relic of feudalism. In the middle ages it was the knight and lord who, by divine right, commanded troops in battle and it is a suspicion that somehow this condition still holds which prejudices Americans as a class against military discipline. If this prejudice could be overcome, every United States citizen would surely bear his share in the defense of national integrity. To do so efficiently he would have to perfect himself in certain military duties. In practice he would have to become an integral part of the national army. When all is said, the army approximates any other business. It is not given to every man to be a boss. Some must be employees. Every American recognizes the reasons for discipline in his business. A little familiarity with army life will show him the imperative need of this same quality in a properly organized system of defense. Gradually, it is to be hoped, the civilian fear of military regulation will fade. Then, with the awakening to the unpreparedness of our country, universal service will be a fact instead of a remote dream.

Meanwhile let us examine what substitute scheme will fill the want of general liability to military training.

Two projects present themselves: First, the utilization of the National Guard as a federal reserve, and, second, the organization of federal volunteers. Before entering into the merits of either plan let us remember the broad lines upon which the European armies are organized. Turning back to the chapters dealing with the various forces, we see that all have, first, the standing army; second, the reserve army (Landwehr); and, third, the Home Guard (Landsturm). With minor modifications this is the standard arrangement in all the armies. Do we not get the hint for the solution of our difficulties from this scheme? From the foundation of the republic the National Guard and the militia have been the home-guard troops. This function has been traditional. In those states that have made an effort to bring guard regiments up to a high standard of efficiency, considerable local pride is lavished on the various organizations. Under existing conditions it would seem that we have here the answer to one part of the preparedness problem. Let the National Guard and militia be the force corresponding to the Landsturm in the foreign armies. With the present units as a basis it would be a comparatively simple expedient to bring all the National Guard regiments under central control and establish interstate standards that would insure a homogeneous force. Federal command of all guard and militia units is essential in this plan. But such command need not in ordinary times interfere with state military development. The function of the state authority would be to bring the guard force up to perfection in line duties. This involves a change in administration and some modifications of present systems; but no serious obstacle blocks the path to the development of efficient battalions properly trained, armed and equipped, under their own officers. Incidentally, it should be exacted of all guard and militia officers, that they serve a specified period with the regular army.

It is unnecessary to elaborate the many details governing the establishment of this third-line defense force. Suffice to say that in all particulars it should be made to conform to regular army standards in so far as possible.

There are three suggestions, nevertheless, that may be put forward:

First: The strength of the National Guard in each state to be proportionate to population and federal aid to be strictly apportioned according to the number of guardsmen actually undergoing training.

Second: All training to be in the field, following the Swiss plan, armory training to be reduced to a minimum.

Third: All officers in time of war above the rank of major to be assigned from a supplementary reserve of the regular army.

In accordance with this third clause, when called into federal service, the state battalions will retain their own line officers, but will be furnished staff and general officers from the regular establishment. In time of peace, certain officers of the United States army will, in addition to their other duties, be assigned to regiments, brigades and divisions of the guard. Whenever the guard is united for federal service, during such periods of training as may be determined upon, these regular officers will officiate in their superior capacities. Otherwise the guard will be under state command.

Such, in outline, is a plan for utilizing the present forces pertaining to the various states and encouraging the establishment of other state troops. The principle of this organization is that state troops are primarily a home guard. They are, in fact and tradition, the third line. Any radical departure from the original plan of service will certainly bring complications sure to impair the strength of the national-defense control.

More difficult in every way is the solving of the problem of creating a second-line force. In principle the troops supplementing the standing army should be the bulk of the fighting strength of the nation. In numbers it should conform to the size of potential expeditionary forces of invasion. Any strength less than 500,000 cannot be considered. In the author’s opinion only a force of such size could save the capital from capture or prevent the capitulation of New York. On the Pacific seaboard, eliminating the question of the defense of the insular possessions, no smaller force could hold the coast and retain Alaska. Thus the immediate task of the United States is to bring into being 500,000 armed and disciplined fighting men. How can this be done?

Compulsory service being out of the question for the time, the safety of the nation must rest upon volunteers. Here we are at once confronted with the query, Can the nation recruit such a number of volunteers in time of peace? In the opinion of certain authorities such recruitment is impossible. But this is opinion, not fact. Before condemning the plan for raising a force that of its own volition comes to the defense of the country, some test should be made of its practicability. The plan means sacrifice, but it would be a sad indictment of American loyalty to take it for granted that the majority of United States citizens are so ignorant or indifferent to the question of defense that they put personal safety before national security.

In order to bring into existence the second line of the American army, the country must be aroused to a sense of its helplessness, and the individual duty each man owes to the commonwealth. To accomplish this I frankly suggest advertising.

Let the facts be known. Put the question squarely up to the young men upon whose shoulders the responsibility of defense rests and let them decide the matter for themselves. Obviously the advertising material must be honest on all counts and scrupulously exact. Nothing of an alarming nature should be emphasized. Simply state the case of the country as now situated; give the strength of the armies of neighboring nations, reproduce the bald statements of what these armies could do if so disposed, and finally, without boasting, indicate the ideals of the United States, the responsibility for maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, and how this responsibility might conflict with the ambitions of other nations.

A volunteer force to be successfully maintained must be popular. This fact must be kept in mind in considering the organization of the suggested second-line army. You have seen, in the chapters dealing with the Swiss and Australian systems, how service is looked upon as an honor. Such an ideal can be built up with an American volunteer force. Let us follow the minute-men tradition. Indicate a standard up to which all who serve must live. Make the second line a corps d’elite. Create a spirit of self-respect as the first requisite of the minute man. Make it a moral as well as a military force. Herein is the germ of success for the army of defense.

Before many years the effect of the training and discipline obtained in such a force would make itself felt in national economic life. Employers will quickly discern the advantages of employees who know the significance of obedience, promptness, neatness and self-respect. In time, a discharge from the minute-men army would be a recommendation bringing preferential employment to all who hold it. As help for entrance into positions where military qualities are necessary, such as express messengers, policemen and watchmen in the great industrial plants and similar occupations, there is no better preliminary training.

To model a working plan for the volunteer army is not the purpose of this book. Systems that have been successfully employed abroad are explained in detail. From the data in hand a competent board of officer and civilian experts can devise a scheme suitable for the United States. Only one prayer is offered in this connection—preserve the whole organization from any taint of partisan politics.

In the arrangement of a volunteer army plan the author has but two suggestions which he puts forward as the result of personal experience:

First: Initiate a course of musketry practice in public schools. Such a course need only be elementary, and include a knowledge of handling and caring for the army rifle, with some gallery practice. It would have for its object the familiarizing of the boy with the weapon which some day he might have to use in defense of his home. No longer does the average boy in the United States have the chance to “go hunting,” as was the case a generation ago. Thus the familiarity with firearms, which was a characteristic of the American people, is gradually being lost. It is to offset this that the suggestion is made.

The second recommendation is that the naturalization laws be changed so that no foreigner can have the right of suffrage until he has served the allotted term in the volunteer army. The right of the vote is the highest privilege of a citizen of this republic. It invests every American with a responsibility in national life. Through the exercise of his vote the citizen shares the weal or woe of his country. No stranger should be granted this exalted right until he is grounded in habits of loyalty to his adopted land. It is not wise to delude ourselves about the standard of patriotism of the average immigrant. He comes to this country from motives of self-interest. His later acts spring from the same causes and not from a sense of obligation to the foster nation.

There is much more that could be written on this subject of preparedness against war. Here the author has only tried to embody certain suggestions on the question that have been the result of a number of years’ study and observation of things military. If he has in some slight way turned the thoughts of his fellow citizens into channels of reflection, the object of this book is fulfilled. Yet before writing finis the author must once more record his opinion that national integrity and the opportunity for maintaining American world standards lie solely in the adoption of universal liability to military or naval training. In the councils of nations, a power is respected only in proportion to its strength.

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES

Page 97: misspelling "Landstrum" corrected.

Page 164: typo "stil lexists" corrected.

Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been left unchanged.

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Table of Contents

- FORE-ARMED How to Build a Citizen Army
- CONTENTS
- FOREWORD
- CHAPTER I The Swiss Military System
- CHAPTER II The German Military System
- CHAPTER III The French Military System
- CHAPTER IV The Australian Military System
- CHAPTER V The English Military System
- CHAPTER VI The New Era in Warfare

- CHAPTER VII The Strategic Position of the United States

- CHAPTER VIII The Instinct of Defense
- CHAPTER IX What Shall We Do?
- THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG™ LICENSE